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Abstract 
Consumers face various costs when investigating and purchasing products in either 
online or offline markets: the travel cost to visit a store and the search cost to 
examine the product attributes once they are at a store. The relative magnitude of 
the costs may lead to different store pricing and consumer search behavior. This 
dissertation builds game-theoretic search models and examines the interaction 
between store pricing and consumer search behavior under different travel and 
search costs in online and offline markets, and positive stockout probabilities in 
Chapter 1. To quantify the difference in consumer demand under different costs, a 
structural demand model has been developed to empirically examine consumer 
demand regarding prices and stockouts between online and offline markets in 
Chapter 2. This dissertation extends the empirical structural demand model and 
estimates the consumer demand for products across different categories. The 
contribution of the dissertation is that it advances the knowledge and understanding 
of consumer demand by: (1) separating the travel and search costs and 
incorporating possible product stockouts associated with consumer demand during 
a shopping trip in online and offline markets; (2) providing empirical evidence that 
supports the relevant theories between online and offline markets; and, by (3) 
shedding light on consumer demand across product categories. 
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1. Let Them Stay or Let Them Go? Price Competition in Online and Offline 
Markets with Consumer Search and Product Stockouts 
1.1 Introduction 
Both online and offline consumers incur various costs during their shopping 
process. For the offline consumers, they travel to visit a retailer, they may spend 
time to investigate product attributes and evaluate the suitableness of the product, 
and occasionally, they may have to go to other retailers due to product 
unavailability, all of which incur costs. For the online consumers, they take time 
to set up their computers or other digital devices to connect to the Internet and 
browse online websites, they may also spend time to investigate product attributes 
and evaluate the suitableness of the product, and occasionally, they may switch to 
other retailers due to product unavailability, all of which also incur costs. 
Consumer search behavior depends on the costs of switching stores and 
switching products (Corstjens and Corstjens 1995). The difference in the costs 
associated with a shopping trip may affect consumer search behavior differently 
(Lynch and Ariely 2000), thus resulting in different consumer responses to prices 
and product availabilities. Despite a number of studies on consumer search 
behavior (e.g., Diamond 1971, Lal and Sarvary 1999), few have decomposed the 
costs that consumers incur during a shopping trip (Bakos 1997, Lynch and Ariely 
2000), and none of them consider the scenario in which a product may be out of 
stock. In this chapter, we seek to narrow the literature gaps by developing a game-
theoretic model in which consumers in purchasing a product incur travel costs to a 
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retailer. Then, if an intended product is out of stock at a favorite retailer, 
consumers incur additional costs of investigating product attributes of unfamiliar 
products or incurring additional costs of traveling to a backup retailer in search of 
the intended product. Note that with offline shopping, travel costs are literal; and 
with online shopping, travel costs are the opportunity cost of time involved in 
shopping and could also be the disutility associated with navigating backup 
websites.   
In our analysis, we characterize the Nash equilibrium of a price-setting 
game in which the equilibrium is a function of the parameter values, representing 
travel costs, product attribute search costs, possible consumer value of products, 
and product stockout probabilities. The Nash equilibrium, depending on the 
parameter values, is one of two types: “let them stay” in which the retailer retains 
consumers when the retailer runs out-of-stock of their intended product; and “let 
them go” in which the retailer releases consumers following a stockout. That is, in 
some circumstances it is best for retailers to set prices so that customers are 
willing to investigate unfamiliar products at the same store when the retailers run 
out-of-stock of customers’ familiar ones; and in other cases retailers set prices 
knowing that customers will go to competitors following stockouts.   
Comparing online and offline travel and search costs, in most scenarios 
travel costs for online shopping are low compared to those of offline shopping. 
However, for certain unfamiliar products the costs of investigating the attributes 
of unfamiliar products can be higher online than offline as offline consumers can 
easily see and feel the products while online consumers can only learn product 
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attributes by reading descriptions. If so, our model indicates that consumers when 
shopping online, compared to shopping offline, are more likely to switch retailers 
following a product stockout. In terms of our model, for parameter values that 
correspond to online shopping, we are more likely to observe a “release-customer 
equilibrium” (let them go) and for parameter values that match offline shopping 
(in which retailers are geographically separated), we are more likely to observe a 
“retain-customer equilibrium” (let them stay).   
In each type of equilibrium, prices are decreasing in travel and search costs 
as well as the stockout probability. This is because consumers are less likely to visit 
a store when the travel and search costs and stockout probability are high.    
Section 1.2 reviews the related literature. Section 1.3 develops the model 
where consumers face separated travel and search costs and possible product 
stockouts and purchase one product by searching multiproduct stores. Section 1.4 
analyzes store pricing decisions given the separated travel and search cost and 
product stockout probabilities. Section 1.5 discusses the results and the limitation 
of the model. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Since the seminal paper by Stigler (1961), many researchers have built game-
theoretic models on consumer search behavior in single-product stores. For 
example, Diamond (1971) constructs a search model where consumers pay a 
search cost to visit a store and learn the price charged by the store. He finds that 
stores charge monopoly price with the existence of search cost no matter how 
small the search cost is, which is known as Diamond paradox. Despite that this 
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result heavily relies on the model assumptions, he argues that competitive 
equilibrium will not be converged with a positive search cost. 
Researchers have further studied effects of different types of search costs. 
Bakos (1997) partitions search costs into three types – the cost of traveling to a 
store, the cost of acquiring price information, and the cost of acquiring 
information about product attributes – and examines consumer search behavior 
among multiple single-product stores. He finds that a nonzero search cost for 
price can result in monopoly prices just as that argued by Diamond (1971), while 
zero search cost for price can result in Bertrand-type competition even with a 
positive search cost for product attributes. 
Lal and Sarvary (1999) study consumer search behavior between substitute 
products where consumers search for one product in two single-product stores. 
They separate the costs associated with a shopping trip to the travel cost from home 
to a store, the switch cost from a store to another, and the (dis)utility of the 
unfamiliar product if the product is (un)fit. They examine how the reduced travel 
and switch cost affect store pricing and consumer search behavior and find that 
stores are able to set monopoly prices when consumers only purchase from their 
favorite store. The monopoly pricing maintains if reducing the travel and search 
cost does not induce consumers to search their backup store. Lal and Sarvary 
(1999)’s model fits the price-directed search model setting, where consumers 
observe price information before search (Armstrong and Zhou 2011, Choi et al. 
2016, Haan et al., 2015, Shen 2015). For the price-directed search model, 
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Armstrong and Zhou (2011) find equilibrium prices decrease with search costs and 
Haan et al. (2015) show that higher search costs intensify price competition. 
Though most of the search models (e.g., Armstrong and Zhou 2011, Bakos 
1997, Haan et al. 2015, Lal and Sarvary 1999) have been concentrated on single-
product stores, where stores only sell one product, multiproduct stores make the 
model more complex and have interesting implications of its own. Zhou (2014) 
studies consumer search behavior between two multiproduct stores. He assumes 
consumers can buy multiple products carried by both stores. His model shows a 
joint-search effect where consumers can obtain information for products once 
they visit a store. The economies of scale in search make consumers more likely 
to stop searching and buy multiple products at a store if the store reduces the price 
of one product.  
Despite search costs, consumer search behavior is also related to product 
stockouts (Corstjens and Corstjens 1995). Campo et al. (2000) construct a 
consumer utility model regarding stockout. They separate the components of 
consumers’ stockout cost: the costs of travel to stores and the costs to search for 
product attributes, and examine how each component contributes to a store’s 
stockout losses. However, they only focus on consumers’ response to stockout 
without studying the interaction between store strategy and consumer search 
behavior.  
In this paper, we construct price-directed game-theoretic search models 
and examine the interaction between retailer pricing and consumer search 
behavior. Specifically, we refine the previous search models by separating the 
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travel and search costs associated with a shopping trip. We focus on consumer 
search behavior between substitute products where consumers only purchase one 
product from one multiproduct retailer. We incorporate stockout probabilities, 
which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been discussed in the previous 
game-theoretic search models.  
1.3 Model Setup 
There are two retailers ! and ", each with one store, selling products 1 and 2 
(e.g., a Colgate toothbrush and an Oral B toothbrush) at constant marginal costs, 
which are normalized to zero.  In our symmetric model, both retailers are online 
or both are offline.  Each consumer intends to purchase one product (e.g., a 
toothbrush) from either retailer ! or retailer ".   
Each consumer has a favorite retailer. Additionally, each consumer is 
familiar with only one of the two products, for example by having experience 
with the product in the past or by having taken time to read its product label, but 
no knowledge about the other. With a unit mass of consumers, they are uniformly 
distributed across favorite retailers and familiar products.  For example, for one-
quarter of them retailer A is their favorite retailer and they are familiar with 
product 1.   
Consumers have a positive, certain valuation # of their familiar product. 
At the onset of shopping, consumers are uncertain about their valuations of the 
unfamiliar product and only can be certain once they have investigated its product 
attributes. Their valuation of the unfamiliar product is either # with probability $, 
or 0 with probability 1 − $ . Consumers have a positive product attribute search 
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cost () to learn the unfamiliar product’s attributes, which they could bear at a 
physical or online retailer.   
In the offline markets, consumers need to pay a transportation cost to 
travel to a brick-and-mortar retail store. In the online markets, consumers need to 
set up their devices (computers, tablets, and/or smartphones) to browse online 
retailers.  The cost to each consumer to travel to her favorite retailer from her 
home is (*.  Consumers spend time and effort to switch from one retailer to 
another, where (+ represents a base cost of switching retailers. Consumers incur 
an additional cost (,	to visit their backup retailer. Hence, the cost of switching 
from a backup to a favorite retailer is (+ and the cost of switching from a favorite 
to a backup retailer is (+ + (,. Offline consumers need to follow the navigation 
system to travel to their backup retailer, while online consumers have to get used 
to the website setting of their backup retailers, which can be interpreted as a 
disutility of (,.  
We assume the prices of both products at both retailers are public 
information. In reality, firms market their price via online ads, TV commercials, 
telemarketing, and etc. Consumers can obtain price information even before their 
shopping trips.  
The probability of a product is in stock at a retailer is 0, 0 < 1, for each 
consumer who visits a retailer. Hence, the stockout probability is 1 − 0.  We 
assume the probability that a retailer runs out of stock of a product is positive, 
exogenous to the retailer’s control, and independent of the stockout probabilities 
of other products. This assumption corresponds to a situation where a retailer 
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cannot control its vendor’s order fulfillment performance. Another case is that an 
unusually high demand caused by exogenous demand shocks (e.g., weather, 
natural disaster) leads to retailer stockouts that a retailer cannot predict. We 
assume stockout probabilities are public information and the status of product 
availability in a retailer is learned by consumers after their visit to the retailer. 
Consumers are time-sensitive such that they are only able to do at most 
two things: purchase their familiar product at the first retailer, purchase their 
unfamiliar product at the first retailer, or purchase their familiar product after 
switching from the first retailer to the second. This assumption is extreme but not 
unrealistic. For example, it is common for the consumers with larger incomes or 
young children to restrict their shopping time. This assumption follows Stigler 
(1961). 
The timing of the events is as follows: The retailers set prices 
simultaneously. Given the advertised product prices, consumers decide which 
retailer to visit. Once the consumers arrive at a retailer, they learn about the 
availability of both products at the retailer. Consumers select a product and, if it is 
in stock, purchase it. If out is out of stock, they either switch to the other product 
(which involves investigation if it is the unfamiliar product) or switch retailers. If 
they switch retailers, they would purchase only their familiar products.  
Figure 1 summarizes consumers’ shopping strategies and the 
corresponding payoffs for visiting retailer A. The process and payoffs of visiting 
retailer " are analogous to those of visiting retailer A. In the figure, branches (1)-
(4) indicate product availability statuses: (1) product 1 is in stock with probability 
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0; (2) product 1 is out-of-stock with probability 1 − 0; (3) product 2 is in stock 
with probability 0; (4) product 2 is out-of-stock with probability 1 − 0. We start 
with the consumer segment who is familiar with product 1 and favors retailer !. 
The other segments follow the same analyses. Consumers have five strategies: 
buy the familiar product at the favorite retailer; buy the unfamiliar product at the 
favorite retailer; buy the familiar product at the backup retailer; buy the unfamiliar 
product at the backup retailer; do not enter the market.  
In our model, a consumer’s utility is  3
= # − 5$678 − 9$:#8;&=8:$7ℎ	7?=9= 6@	9ℎ8	7?A=BC8$	5B$7ℎ:=8=	:	5$?DB79	E69ℎ	#:;B8	#,−5$678 − 9$:#8;&=8:$7ℎ	7?=9= 6@	9ℎ8	7?A=BC8$	5B$7ℎ:=8=	:	5$?DB79	E69ℎ	#:;B8	0,0 6@	9ℎ8	7?A=BC8$	D?8=	A?9	8A98$	9ℎ8	C:$(89.  
Retailer A’s expected profit is   FG 5 = 5G*HG* 5 + 5GIHGI 5 , 
where HG* and HGI are expected demand at prices 5 = (5G*, 5GI, 5K*, 5KI). 
Retailer "’s profit is analogous.  
1.4 Equilibrium Analysis 
In the equilibrium of our model, which is symmetric in the sense that the retailers 
set the same prices of the two products, because the travel cost to visit the favorite 
retailer (* is lower than the cost ((* + (,) to visit their backup retailer, 
consumers always visit their favorite retailer first, whenever the prices set by their 
favorite retailer are no more than the prices set by their backup retailer. Given the 
same prices at both retailers, switching retailers happens only when consumers 
run across a stockout/stockouts of their familiar product/both products at their 
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favorite retailer. Consumers search the other retailer only if their expected utility 
of purchasing from the other retailer is higher than that by purchasing from the 
current retailer. Consumers are aware that they may incur a stockout of one or 
both products after they switch to the other retailer. 
Once consumers are at a retailer, they will search for only their unfamiliar 
product under two scenarios: (1) their familiar product is in stock and the price of 
their unfamiliar product is sufficiently low to compensate their uncertainty of the 
valuation of the unfamiliar product; or (2) their familiar product is out-of-stock. In 
the case that retailers only sell to their consumer segments (i.e., the consumers 
who favor the retailer), the first scenario will never happen as the retailer earns 
lower profits by setting a lower price on one product than the other and attracting 
both consumer segments by the lower-priced product than by setting the same 
prices and attracting each consumer segment by the individual product. We 
therefore focus on the second scenario when consumers may search for the 
unfamiliar product only if their familiar product is out-of-stock. With the strategy 
of not entering the market, the consumers earn a payoff of zero. In the case (1) 
product 1 is in stock at retailer !, the consumer earn a payoff of # − (* − 5G* by 
purchasing product 1. In case (2) product 1 is out-of-stock and in case (3) product 
2 is in stock at the same time.  If so, with the purchase strategy, the consumer 
payoff is $ ∙ # − 5GI − (* − k) by purchasing from the same retailer, retailer !. 
This is because the consumers will not buy the unfamiliar product if they have a 
zero valuation of their unfamiliar product. Now consider the case in which (2) and 
(3) occur simultaneously. If the consumers choose not to buy, they have paid the 
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travel cost (* to check the availability of product 1 at retailer !. If the consumers 
choose to switch to their backup retailer, they buy product 1 and have a payoff of # − 5K* − (* − (+ − (, whenever product 1 is available as long as # ≥ 5K*. 
Since the consumers are time-sensitive, they give up the purchase if their familiar 
product is not available in the second retailer and make a payoff of −(* − (+ −(,. 
We turn to case (2) and (4) in which neither product is in stock at retailer 
A. Recall that the consumers have already paid the travel cost (* to visit their 
favorite retailer, they make a negative payoff of – (* by giving up their purchase. 
If they switch retailers and purchase product 1 whenever it’s in stock, their payoff 
is # − 5K* − (* − (+ − (,. If they find the familiar product is not available or 
neither product is available and choose not to purchase, they make a payoff of – (* − (+ − (, by giving up the purchase.  
Having outlined consumers’ options, we move on to characterize the two 
potential pure-strategy equilibria: (a) consumers always purchase from their 
favorite retailer and give up their purchase if neither product is in stock, (b) 
consumers always purchase their familiar product and give up their purchase if 
their familiar product is not available. In equilibrium (a), the retailer retains its 
consumers when it runs out of stock of a product, we thus call it retain-customer 
equilibrium. In equilibrium (b), the retailer releases its consumers when it runs out 
of stock of a product, we thus call it release-customer equilibrium. 
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1.4.1 Retain-Customer Equilibrium 
Proposition 1. There is a unique pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium in 
which consumers only purchase from their favorite retailers if and only if 
(+ + (, − () ∙ −0Q + 0I + 0 + (* ∙ 0 − $0 ∙ [1 + $ ∙ (1 − 0)] ≥ 0, (1.1) 
(* ∙ $ − () ∙ 0 ≥ 0, (1.2) 
−# ∙ 0 ∙ 1 − 0 + () ∙ 0I − () ∙ 2 + $ − 0I ∙ $1 + $ ∙ (1 − 0) + (+ + (,
∙ 2 + $ − 0 ∙ $ − 0 + (* ∙ $ − 00 + (* ∙ $ ∙ 1 − 00 ∙ [1 + $ ∙ (1 − 0)]≥ 0, 
(1.3) 
 
−# ∙ 0 + (+ ∙ 2 + $ − 0 ∙ $ + () ∙ 0 ∙ 1 − 0 + (*1 + $ ∙ (1 − 0) ≥ 0. (1.4) 
In this equilibrium, prices are positive 5U = 5G* = 5K* = 5GI = 5KI = # −VW∙X *YX ZV[X∙[*ZU∙(*YX)]. In case of a bad search that consumers obtain zero utility on their 
unfamiliar product, consumers give up the purchase. Retailers’ profits are 
Y(U∙\YVW)∙X]Z[(UZ*)∙\YVW]∙XYV[I , and consumer surplus is 0.  
Proof of Proposition 1  
In proposed retain-customer equilibrium, because all prices are the same, if a 
consumer’s familiar product is available at her favorite retailer, she purchases it.  
Otherwise, following a stockout of this product, also in equilibrium, the consumer 
would stay in the same retailer and investigate her unfamiliar product. She would 
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do so because her expected utility in the retain-customer equilibrium, 3U, is no less 
than her expected utility of first visiting her favorite retailer, then following a 
stockout of her familiar product, switching retailers, 3^.  Specifically,    3U − 3+ = $ ∙ # − 5U − () − (* − 0 ∙ # − 5U − (* − (+ − (,
= (+ + (, − () ∙ −0Q + 0I + 0 + (* ∙ 0 − $0 ∙ 1 + $ ∙ 1 − 0 ≥ 0. 
Additionally, her expected utility of the retain-customer equilibrium is no less than 
her outside option utility, 0:   
3U − −(* = $ ∙ # − 5U − () − (* − −(* = (* ∙ $ − () ∙ 00 ∙ [1 + (1 − 0) ∙ $] ≥ 0. 
The first inequality is equivalent to condition (1.1), and the second inequality is 
equivalent to condition (1.2).   
Next, we identify conditions under which deviations by the retailers from 
the proposed equilibrium prices are unprofitable. There are two possible deviations 
by a retailer to consider: (i) decrease the price of one of its products just enough to 
induce the other retailer’s consumers who are familiar with the product to switch 
retailers following a stockout of the product, and (ii) decrease price even further, 
but also just enough, to attract these same consumers to visit the deviating retailer 
first.   
Consider deviation (i).  The expected utility a consumer can get by 
switching given her familiar product is not available at her favorite retailer, 3+_, 
must be no less than the utility of purchasing from the current retailer, 3U_: 3+_ = 0 ∙ # − 5* − (* − (+ − (, ≥ 3U_ = $ ∙ # − 5U − () − (*. 
The retailer’s optimal price to induce this deviation, 5+`, is:  
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5+` ≡ # − (+ + (,0 + () ∙ 0 − (* ∙ $0I ∙ 1 + $ ∙ 1 − 0 .	
The equilibrium profit, F*U , less the profit from this deviation, F*+` , which is 
condition (1.3), is:  
FU − F+` = 14 ∙ −# ∙ 0 ∙ 1 − 0 + () ∙ 0I − () ∙ 2 + $ − 0I ∙ $1 + $ ∙ 1 − 0 + (+ + (,
∙ 2 + $ − 0 ∙ $ − 0 + (* ∙ $ − 00 + (* ∙ $ ∙ 1 − 00 ∙ 1 + $ ∙ 1 − 0 ≥ 0. 
Therefore, a retailer does not set 5+`.  
Consider deviation (ii).  A consumer’s expected utility of initially visiting 
her backup retailer, and remaining there following a stockout of her familiar 
product, 3c , must be no less than  her expected utility of the retain-customer 
equilibrium, 3U. That is:   3c = 0 ∙ # − 5I + 1 − 0 ∙ 0 ∙ $ ∙ # − 5U − () − (* − (, ≥ 3U= 	0 ∙ # − 5U + 1 − 0 ∙ 0 ∙ $ ∙ # − 5U − () − (*. 
The retailer’s optimal price that induces this deviation, 5c, is:  
5c ≡ # − () ∙ 0 ∙ 1 − 0 + (*0 ∙ 1 + $ ∙ 1 − 0 − (,0 = 5U − (,0 	.	
The equilibrium profit, FU , less the profit from this deviation, Fc , which is 
condition (1.4), is:  
FU − Fc = 14 ∙ −# ∙ 0 + (+ ∙ 2 + $ − 0 ∙ $ + () ∙ 0 ∙ 1 − 0 + (*1 + $ ∙ (1 − 0) ≥ 0. 
With conditions (1.1) through (1.4) satisfied, a retain-customer equilibrium exists.   
Q.E.D.  
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Proposition 1 states the conditions under which consumers only purchase 
from their favorite retailer and never switch to the backup retailer. Lemma 1 
suggests that retailers are able to set monopoly prices even when consumers have 
zero cost to obtain price information. The positive probabilities that consumers 
incur product stockouts make it possible for retailers to increase prices without 
altering consumer search behavior. The result is consistent with Lal and Sarvary 
(1999) that the monopoly pricing maintains when no consumers switch retailers 
and consumer surplus remains zero. 
1.4.2 Release-Customer Equilibrium 
Proposition 2. There is a unique pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium where 
consumers only purchase their familiar products if and only if 
() − (+ + (, ∙ 0 + (1 − 0) ∙ $ + (* ∙ $ − 00 ∙ 2 − 0 ≥ 0, (1.13) (* − (+ − (, ≥ 0, (1.14) 
−$ ∙ 0 ∙ 1 − 0 ∙ # + () ∙ 0 ∙ $ ∙ 1 − 0 − 0 + 2$ + (* ∙ 0 ∙ $ + 1$+ 2 ∙ (10 − 2 − C + d ∙ 0 + 2 ∙ $$ − 2 ∙ C + d0 − 2 ≥ 0, (1.15) # ∙ 0I ∙ $ − 0I − 0 ∙ $ + (+ ∙ 0 − 0 ∙ $ + (, ∙ 3 ∙ 0 − 0I ∙ $
− (+ + (, ∙ 0 − $ − (* ∙ 0 + (1 −  ) ∙ $2 − 0 ≥ 	0 (1.16) 
In this equilibrium, prices are positive 5+ = 5G* = 5K* = 5GI = 5KI = # −V[Z VfZVg ∙ *YXX∙ IYX , retailers’ profits are YX]∙\Z I∙\ZVfZVg ∙XYV[YVfYVgI  and consumer 
surplus is 0.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
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In the proposed release-customer equilibrium, because all prices are the same, if a 
consumer’s familiar product is available at her favorite retailer, she purchases it.  
Otherwise, following a stockout of this product, also in equilibrium, the consumer 
would switch to the other retailer and purchase her familiar product if it is available. 
She would do so because her expected utility of the release-customer equilibrium, 3+, is no less than her expected utility of first visiting her favorite retailer, then 
following a stockout of her familiar product, searching for her unfamiliar 
product,	3U.  Specifically, 3+ − 3U = 0 ∙ # − 5+ − (* − (+ − (, − $ ∙ # − 5+ − () − (*
= () − (+ + (, ∙ 0 + 1 − 0 ∙ $ + (* ∙ $ − 00 ∙ 2 − 0 ≥ 0. 
Additionally, her expected utility of the release-customer equilibrium is no less than 
her outside option utility, 0:   
3+ − −(* = 0 ∙ # − 5+ − (* − (+ − (, − −(* = (* − (+ − (,2 − 0 ≥ 0. 
The first inequality is equivalent to condition (1.13), and the second inequality is 
equivalent to condition (1.14).   
Next, we identify conditions under which all possible deviations from the 
proposed equilibrium are unprofitable. There are two possible deviations: (i) 
decrease the price of one of its products just enough to prevent its own consumers 
who are familiar with the product to switch retailers following a stockout of the 
product, and (ii) decrease price even further, but also just enough, to induce the 
other retailer’s consumers who are familiar with the product to visit the retailer first.   
18 	
Consider deviation (i). The expected utility a consumer can get by searching 
for her unfamiliar product at her favorite retailer given her familiar product is not 
available, 3U , must be no less than the utility of purchasing from the other 
retailer,	3+_: 3U_ = $ ∙ # − 5U` − () − (* ≥ 3+h = 0 ∙ # − 5+ − (* − (+ − (,. 
The retailer’s optimal price to induce this deviation, 5U` is:  
5U` ≡ # − ()$ − (* − (+ − (,2 − 0 ∙ $ .	
The equilibrium profit, F+ , less the profit from this deviation, FU` , which is 
condition (1.15), is:  
F+ − FU` = 14 ∙ −$ ∙ 0 ∙ 1 − 0 ∙ # + () ∙ 0 ∙ $ ∙ 1 − 0 − 0 + 2$ + (* ∙ 0
∙ $ + 1$ + 2 ∙ (10 − 2 − C + d ∙ 0 + 2 ∙ $$ − 2 ∙ C + d0 − 2 ≥ 0. 
Therefore, a retailer does not set 5U`.  
Consider deviation (ii).  A consumer’s expected utility of initially visiting 
her backup retailer, and switching to her favorite retailer following a stockout of 
her familiar product, 3c, must be no less than  her expected utility of the release-
customer equilibrium, 3+. That is:   3c = 0 ∙ # − 5i + 1 − 0 ∙ 0 ∙ # − 5+ − (+ − (* − d ≥ 3+= 0 ∙ # − 5+ + 1 − 0 ∙ 0 ∙ # − 5+ − (+ − (, − (*. 
The retailer’s optimal price that induces this deviation, 5c, is:  
5c ≡ # − d − (* + (+ + (, ∙ 1 − 02 − 0 ∙ 0 . 
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The equilibrium profit, F+ , less the profit from this deviation, Fc , which is 
condition (1.16), is: 
F+ − Fc = 14 ∙ # ∙ 0I ∙ $ − 0I − 0 ∙ $ + (+ ∙ 0 − 0 ∙ $ + (, ∙ 3 ∙ 0 − 0I ∙ $
− (+ + (, ∙ 0 − $ − (* ∙ 0 + 1 − 0 ∙ $2 − 0 . 
With conditions (1.13) through (1.16) satisfied, a retain-customer equilibrium 
exists.   
Q.E.D.  
Proposition 2 states the conditions under which consumers only purchase 
their familiar product and never purchase their unfamiliar product. In other words, 
the retailer releases its consumers after a product stockout. Release-customer 
equilibrium requires that the travel cost from home is relatively higher than the 
summation of the additional cost to the backup retailer and the base switch cost 
from one retailer to another (see condition (1.14)), while retain-customer 
equilibrium requires that the product attribute search cost is low and the travel cost 
is high (see condition (1.2)). There is no overlap of their parameter spaces except 
when consumers are indifferent between purchasing from their favorite retailer or 
purchasing their familiar product. In this case, the retain-customer equilibrium 
prices are equal to the release-customer equilibrium prices.  
Our model can be easily applied to online and offline retailing given the 
difference in travel and search costs between online and offline markets. Online 
markets are considered to reduce the travel cost while offline markets are 
advantageous in providing the information of product attributes (Lal and Sarvary 
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1999). Therefore, retain-customer equilibrium is suitable to describe the offline 
markets where the travel cost is more significant than the product attribute search 
cost. Consistent with retain-customer equilibrium, offline consumers are more 
likely to search for substitute products carried by the same retailer. To retain 
consumers, offline retailers implement substitution strategies to substitute a product 
for the one that is not in stock. Release-customer equilibrium is applicable to the 
online markets where the additional cost to the backup retailer and the base switch 
cost from one retailer to another are marginal. Consistent with release-customer 
equilibrium, online consumers are willing to search for their familiar product across 
various retailers.  
1.4.3 Effects of Travel and Search Costs and Stockout Probability 
Having outlined the two mutually exclusive equilibria, it is important to examine 
the effects of travel and search costs and stockouts on the equilibrium price. Hence, 
we calculate the comparative statics of the equilibrium price regarding the travel 
cost to the favorite retailer (*, the additional cost to the backup retailer (,, the base 
switch cost from one retailer to the other (+, the product attribute search cost to 
learn the attributes of the unfamiliar product (), and the probability a product is in 
stock 0.  
Proposition 3: The price is decreasing in: (1) the travel cost to the favorite retailer (*  in both retain-customer and release-customer equilibria, (2) the product 
attribute search cost () in retain-customer equilibrium, and (3) the additional cost 
to the backup retailer (, or the base switch cost from one retailer to the other (+ 
in release-customer equilibrium.  
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Proof of Proposition 3 
The first-order derivative of retain-customer equilibrium price regarding (* is  −1[1 + 1 − 0 ∙ $] ∙ 0, 
and that of release-customer equilibrium price regarding (* is  −12 − 0 ∙ 0, 
both of which are negative. Both equilibrium prices are decreasing in the travel cost (*.  
The first-order derivative of retain-customer equilibrium price regarding () 
is  −1 + 01 + 1 − 0 ∙ $, 
which is negative. The equilibrium price is decreasing in the product attribute 
search cost () . As consumers only purchase from their favorite retailer, the 
additional cost/disutility to visit their backup retailer (,  and the cost to switch 
retailers (+  are irrelevant to consumers’ purchase decisions. The first-order 
derivative of retain-customer equilibrium price regarding either (, or (+ is 0. 
The first-order derivative of release-customer equilibrium price regarding 
either additional cost/disutility to the backup retailer (, or the cost of switch cost (+ is the same − 1 − 00 ∙ 2 − 0 , 
which is negative. In the release-customer equilibrium, consumers only purchase 
their familiar products, thus making the product attribute search cost () irrelevant 
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to consumers’ purchase decision. The first-order derivative of release-customer 
equilibrium price regarding () is 0. Q.E.D. 
 The proposition indicates that both equilibrium prices are decreasing in the 
travel cost (*,	since a higher travel cost makes it more difficult for consumers to 
make a purchase in the first place. As a result, a retailer reduces prices to 
compensate for the reduction of consumers’ expected utility due to the high travel 
cost. The product attribute search cost ()  is irrelevant to release-customer 
equilibrium as consumers never examine the product attributes of their unfamiliar 
product in release-customer equilibrium. The additional cost to the backup retailer (, or the base switch cost from one retailer to the other (+ are irrelevant to retain-
customer equilibrium as consumers only purchase from their favorite retailer.  
The retain-customer equilibrium price is decreasing in the product attribute 
search cost (), since a higher search cost makes it more difficult for consumers to 
stay at the retailer and purchase their unfamiliar product. As a result, the retailer 
reduces prices to retain consumers following the stockout of a product. The release-
customer equilibrium price is decreasing in the additional cost to the backup retailer (, or the switch cost from one retailer to the other (+, since a higher cost to get to 
the backup retailer or a higher base switch cost makes it more difficult for 
consumers to go to the unfamiliar or second retailer. The retailer reduces prices to 
attract the other retailer’s consumers when the other retailer runs out-of-stock. Since	the equilibrium price is decreasing in travel and search costs, retailers 
have the incentive to reduce the costs associated with a shopping trip. The Internet 
reduces the travel cost from home and switch costs to another retailer by allowing 
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consumers to visit online retailers without physically traveling to the brick-and-
mortar retail stores. Online retailers adopt similar webpage settings to reduce 
consumer disutility to get used to their websites and various strategies to reduce the 
product attribute search cost. Amazon.com uses customer review systems to rate 
products. Besides customer review systems, tirerack.com measures the relevant 
tires’ (relevant to consumer specified vehicle) performance on a set of metrics and 
presents an easy-to-read comparison table to further reduce the product attribute 
search cost. In the offline markets, shopping malls are located near a highway to 
reduce consumer travel time. Brick-and-mortar retail stores tend to cluster to reduce 
the switch cost from one retailer to another and the additional disutility that 
consumers need to navigate to another retailer. The retailers optimize their layout 
so that consumers can easily search for products and may hire advisors to help 
consumers get familiar with product attributes.    
Proposition 4: Price is decreasing in the stockout probability 1 − 0 in both retain-
customer and release-customer equilibria.  
Proof of Proposition 4 
The first-order derivative of retain-customer equilibrium price regarding 0 is  () ∙ 0I − 2 ∙ (* ∙ 0 ∙ $ + (* ∙ $ + (*0I ∙ 1 + $ − 0 ∙ $ I , 
and that of release-customer equilibrium price regarding 0 is  (+ + (, ∙ 0I − 2 ∙ (* + (+ + (, ∙ 0 + 2 ∙ (* + 2 ∙ (+ + 2 ∙ (,0I ∙ 2 − 0 I , 
both of which are positive. This implies both equilibrium prices are decreasing in 
the stockout probability 1 − 0. Q.E.D. 
24 	
The proposition shows that the effect of stockouts is two-fold in both 
equilibria. On one hand, consumers are less likely to visit a retailer when they face 
a higher probability to incur a stockout. The retailer needs to reduce prices to attract 
consumers in the first place. On the other hand, consumers are more likely to stay 
in the current retailer with a lower stockout probability, which reduces the 
competition between retailers. Therefore, the retailers are able to increase price and 
still get the same market share. 
Besides the effect of travel and search costs and stockouts on consumer 
search and price competition, it is important to point out that the equilibrium profit 
is the highest profit that a retailer can earn given the best response of the other 
retailer. In other words 
Proposition 5: A retailer is better off and makes a higher profit by giving up its 
consumers to the other retailer when it runs out-of-stock of a product in release-
customer equilibrium. When the travel and search costs as well as the stockout 
probability satisfy conditions in retain-customer equilibrium, it is worth setting 
prices to retain consumers following a product stockout.  
Proof of Proposition 5 
Following the proofs of both equilibria, a retailer earns less profit when deviating 
from the equilibrium prices. Specifically, when a retailer runs out of stock of a 
product, it is unprofitable for the retailer to lower its price and attracts the other’s 
consumers under the retain-customer equilibrium; and it is also unprofitable for the 
retailer to lower its price to prevent its own consumers from switching retailers 
under the release-customer equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
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Given the relatively low switch	cost	from	one	retailer	to	another, online 
consumers can easily search for their familiar product across online retailers. As a 
result, online retailers are better off by giving up consumers when they run out-of-
stock. Offline consumers are likely to search for their unfamiliar product in the 
same retailer given the relatively low product attribute search cost, thus offline 
retailers should set prices to retain consumers following a product stockout. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we seek to understand retailer pricing and consumer search behavior 
with separated travel and search costs associated with a shopping trip. We consider 
four possible costs: the travel cost from home to visit a retailer, the switch cost from 
one retailer to another, the additional cost to visit the backup retailer, and the 
product attribute search cost. We examine the interaction between retailer pricing 
and consumer search behavior with the existence of separated travel and search 
costs, as well as positive probabilities that a consumer incurs product stockouts.    
We identify two types of equilibria with distinct consumer search behavior. 
Consumers visit their favorite retailer for their familiar product and purchase the 
other product from the same retailer when their familiar product is out-of-stock in 
retain-customer equilibrium, whereas consumers search various retailers for their 
familiar product in release-customer equilibrium. In retain-customer equilibrium, 
retailers are able to set monopoly prices when consumers are loyal to purchase from 
their favorite retailer because of the existence of positive stockout probabilities. In 
both retain-customer and release-customer equilibria, we find that equilibrium 
prices are decreasing in the travel and search costs as well as the stockout 
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probabilities because consumers are less likely to visit a retailer when the costs 
and/or stockout probabilities are high. The retailers thus have the incentive to 
reduce the costs associated with a shopping trip and implement various inventory 
policies to reduce stockout probabilities. However, retailers are better off by giving 
up consumers to the rival retailer when consumers only purchase their familiar 
product.   
Our model can be applied to online and offline retailing given the difference 
in the travel and search costs between online and offline markets. Retain-customer 
equilibrium is suitable to describe offline markets, where the travel cost is more 
significant than the product attribute search cost. Offline consumers have a high 
travel cost to go to another brick-and-mortar retail store, thus offline retailers 
implement substitution strategies to retain consumers when they run out-of-stock. 
Release-customer equilibrium is applicable to the online markets where the 
additional cost to the backup retailer and the base switch cost from one retailer to 
another are marginal. Online consumers are willing to search for their familiar 
product across various retailers and online retailers are better off by giving up 
consumers following product stockouts. Finally, we discuss a few possible future 
research directions. First, future studies can relax the assumption that consumers 
face the same costs to/at either retailer and make the costs asymmetric. For example, 
consumers may shop in the online and offline markets at the same time. They may 
have a low travel cost to an online retailer but find it is easier to examine product 
attributes in the brick-and-mortar retail stores.  Second, one can allow endogenous 
stockouts. In the real world, high-tech companies conduct hunger marketing which 
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restricts product supply to stimulate consumers’ purchasing desire. The endogenous 
stockout probability can be incorporated in a two-stage game where retailers set 
inventory levels first and then prices. 
 
Figure 1.1: Consumers’ Strategies and Corresponding Payoffs  
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2. Between Online and Offline Markets: A Structural Estimation of 
Consumer Demand  
2.1 Introduction 
The online markets enabled by the Internet are more efficient than the offline 
markets (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) due to the reduced consumers’ search costs 
(Bakos 1997). In the online markets, with the help of search engines such as Google 
Shopping, consumers can search stores and products without having to physically 
travel to offline stores. The classic model of Bertrand competition predicts perfectly 
elastic demand since consumers can freely switch between competitive offerings, 
and it leads firms to set a uniform price.  
Over the past decades, along with the development of the online markets, a 
large body of literature has studied the supply-side effect of the online markets and 
debated on whether the online markets are truly efficient. On the one hand, some 
studies compare prices between online and offline markets and find empirical 
support of both lower prices (e.g., Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Brynjolfsson and 
Smith 2000, Degeratu et al. 2000) and lower price dispersions (e.g., Brynjolfsson 
and Smith 2000, Ghose and Yao 2011) in the online markets. On the other hand, 
other studies show that prices may be higher in the online markets than those in the 
offline markets (e.g., Bailey 1998, Lal and Sarvary 1999) or insignificantly 
different between online and offline markets (Cavallo 2017), and price dispersions 
are still sizable in the online markets (e.g., Baye et al. 2003, 2004, 2006a, and 2006b, 
Clay et al. 2001 and 2002, Clemons et al. 2002).  
29 	
The research of the demand-side is limited (Granados et al. 2012). Several 
studies have made attempts to evaluate the price elasticity in the online and offline 
markets and found mixed evidence (e.g., Chu et al. 2008, Ghose and Yao 2011, 
Granados et al. 2012). For example, using the federal government data and travel 
agency data, respectively, Ghose and Yao (2011) and Granados et al. (2012) find a 
higher own-price elasticity online than offline, whereas Chu et al. (2008) show a 
lower own-price elasticity online than offline in a grocery chain.  
The mixed findings suggest two departures from the classic Bertrand model 
is important in determining the price elasticity of demand, product heterogeneity 
and search cost. During a shopping trip, the search costs affect consumer decision 
on which products to buy. For example, a consumer going to a grocery store 
planning to buy the Colgate 360 Adult Full Head Soft Toothbrush 4 Pack 
toothbrushes ends up buying a Crest Proplus Soft/Medium Toothbrush 2 Pack since 
the two products lay side-by-side on the shelf and the consumer finds the latter 
more attractive in both price and attributes. 
Hence, empirically estimating the price elasticity of demand and product 
substitutability online and offline sheds light on search costs in these two channels. 
Given the difference in search costs between online offline markets, is there any 
difference in consumer demand?  We are particularly interested in two demand-
triggering variables, price changes and product stockouts (e.g., Duan et al. 2015, 
Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Smith and Agrawal 2000). We are trying to answer the 
research question: given the difference in search costs, do offline consumers do 
differently than online consumers regarding price change and product stockouts?  
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In this chapter, we use a large-scale dataset on consumer packaged goods 
collected from a large supermarket chain and estimated a random coefficients 
discrete choice demand model within stores. We compute the own- and cross-price 
within stores elasticities which gives us implications on search costs comparisons 
online and offline. We then conduct counterfactuals on how price changes and 
product stockouts affect market shares, brand, and store revenue. We find that the 
own-price elasticity is higher in magnitude offline (i.e., -1.74 on average) than that 
online (i.e., -0.87 on average), suggesting that the offline consumer demand is more 
price-elastic than the online consumer demand, and that the cross-price elasticity is 
also higher offline (i.e., 0.18 on average) than that online (i.e., 0.05 on average), 
suggesting that the offline consumers are more likely to buy substitute products 
than the online consumers. When a product is out-of-stock, in the offline markets, 
6.55% of the loss of the market share goes to the common products carried by both 
online and offline stores on average, while in the online markets, 6.05% of the loss 
of the market share goes to the common products on average. Our findings suggest 
that, when considering substitute products, the impact of price increases can be 
surprising. The retailer may not be worse off because the gains in the revenue from 
the substitute products can make up more than the losses. While the retailers may 
not be worse off when increasing the prices, through consumer welfare analysis, 
we find that consumers are hurt more in the offline markets than in the online 
markets because the offline market is more concentrated on the common products 
carried by both online and offline markets. 
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Our study makes a number of important contributions. First, while there is 
extensive literature comparing prices and price dispersions between online and 
offline markets on the supply-side, researches of the demand-side are still limited, 
and the findings are mixed at best. As put by Granados et al. (2012), "there is still 
much research to be done on the demand-side effects." Although our study is 
unlikely to close the debate, it provides empirical evidence that lends support to the 
view that the online own-price elasticity is lower than the offline own-price 
elasticity in certain settings. Furthermore, there have been very few studies on 
estimating and comparing cross-price elasticity between online and offline markets. 
Estimating the cross-price elasticity in the online and offline markets helps us better 
understand the changes in customer demand under different levels of search costs. 
Second, our study extends the theoretical model to a more realistic setting where 
customers can search for substitute products, induced by price changes and product 
stockouts. We focus on the search costs to learn product attributes at a store and 
develop theoretical arguments on why both own- and cross-price elasticities are 
higher offline than online. The theoretical arguments are confirmed by our 
empirical findings that, when price increases or product is out-of-stock, offline 
customers are more likely to purchase substitute products from the same store, and 
online customers are less responsive to buy substitute products. Third, our study 
estimate and compare the gains or losses in consumer welfare from price increases 
or product stockouts between online and offline markets. Our results complement 
prior studies on estimating the gains in consumer welfare from the Internet (Bapna 
et al. 2008, Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Ghose and Yao 2011, Ghose et al. 2006) by 
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showing that online consumers’ welfare is reduced in the offline markets when 
price increases or product stocks out.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a 
summary of the relevant literature and the theoretical background. Section 2.3 
details our empirical context and data. Section 2.4 presents the econometric model 
and describes our estimation method. Section 2.5 presents the estimation results 
and analyses. Section 2.6 presents the analysis of consumer welfare estimation. 
Finally, Section 2.7 discusses the results, theoretical and managerial implications, 
research limitations, and future research. 
2.2 Literature and Theory 
2.2.1 Price Elasticity 
As discussed above, there are two approaches to study the difference between 
online and offline markets, the supply-side perspective and the demand-side 
perspective. From the supply-side perspective, an extensive body of literature has 
examined and compared prices and price dispersions between online and offline 
markets (e.g., Baye et al. 2004, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Ghose and Yao 2011, 
Li et al. 2013, Overby and Forman 2014, Zhao et al. 2015) However, from the 
demand-side perspective, the literature has been scarce on the comparison of 
consumer demand between online and offline markets. 
To compare consumer demand between online and offline markets, studies 
examine the own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticity between online and 
offline markets and the findings are not in consensus. Granados et al. (2012) use 
airline ticket booking data in both online and offline markets and find the own-price 
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elasticity at offline phone-based or face-to-face travel agencies is -0.73, lower than 
-1.11 at online consumer direct-booking platforms such as Expedia and Travelocity 
and -1.64 at opaque online travel agencies such as Hotwire and Priceline.com. 
Using transaction data from the U.S. government, Ghose and Yao (2011) report a 
higher own-price elasticity in the online market than that in the offline markets: -
1.47 in the online market and -0.84 in the offline markets. Ellison and Ellison 
(2009) empirically study the loss-leader strategy that obfuscates consumers by 
posting low prices of damaged goods at an online price search engine and find 
extremely high own-price elasticities (more than -3.6) for the products at two online 
computer parts sellers. Degeratu et al. (2000) study a grocery chain and find a 
higher price sensitivity in the online market than that in its offline markets. By 
contrast, Chu et al. (2008), who also study a grocery chain, use households who 
shop groceries both online and offline and show a lower own-price elasticity in the 
online market than that in the offline markets. They attribute the lower online own-
price elasticity to consumers’ time sensitivity and convenience of shopping online, 
both of which may reduce price elasticity online. Lynch and Ariely (2000) conduct 
experiments at two online wine retailers and examine consumers’ price sensitivity 
on wine, and find that a lower price search cost and a lower search cost to compare 
stores result in a higher own-price elasticity while a lower product attribute search 
cost reduces consumer price sensitivity. 
While some studies examine the cross-price elasticity between product 
categories (Gentzkow 2007, Kim et al. 2010), few papers have studied the cross-
price elasticity between online and offline markets. Among the few, Ellison and 
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Ellison (2009) find negative cross-price elasticities for computer memory modules 
at two online computer parts sellers, implying the price increases of the focal 
product reduce the demand for substitute products; Danaher et al. (2014) examine 
market-level demand data for songs and albums sold by a label company at an 
online retailer and demonstrate a negative cross-price elasticity that may be due to 
consumers' switching behavior from songs to albums when price increases.  The 
paucity of the research on estimating and comparing the cross-price elasticity 
between online and offline markets points to an important contribution of our study. 
2.2.2 Search Cost under Product Substitution 
Consumers’ search cost can be decomposed into several components: the travel 
cost to visit a store, the search cost to acquire price information, and the search cost 
to learn product attributes (Bakos 1997, Lynch and Ariely 2000). When prior 
literature considers the search cost, they mostly consider the search cost associated 
with searching for a single product (e.g., Bakos 1997, Diamond 1971). For example, 
Diamond (1971) assumes stores carry a homogenous good and consumers pay 
search costs to learn the price charged by each store. He does not consider the search 
cost for substitute products. Our setting is different in that we study the consumers’ 
switching behavior regarding price increases or product stockout. When these 
scenarios happen, a consumer may search for and purchase substitute products. 
Hence, in our setting, we consider the search costs associated with searching for the 
substitute products; that is, the search cost to acquire substitute products’ price 
information and the search cost to learn substitute products’ attributes.  
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The components of the search cost are different between online and offline 
markets, thereby resulting in different levels of search costs online and offline. For 
the search cost to acquire price information, we fold this component within search 
cost to learn substitute products’ attributes, online or offline, the consumer should 
easily acquire price information as the price information is posted on the shelf or 
along with the product on the webpage.  
For the search cost to learn substitute products’ attributes, it is determined 
by how products are demonstrated between online and offline markets. In the 
offline markets (i.e., a retail store), all the substitute products are displayed next to 
each other in a shelf section. Consumers can easily pick up substitute products and 
study the information on the package, and even look into, touch and feel the 
products in the package. For the online markets, consumers need to start from 
scratch to search for substitute products. (Note that online recommender systems 
normally recommend complementary products instead of substitute products.) 
Once consumers find a substitute product, they need to read the webpage that 
contains the product information. To illustrate it as an example, we produced this 
process in Amazon.com. Assume our focal product is Crest 1 Pack toothbrush. We 
went to Amazon.com and search for the Crest 1 Pack toothbrush. From the Crest 1 
Pack toothbrush search result page, we clicked into the product page. Now, at this 
moment, assume that we wanted to check out a substitute product Colgate 1 Pack 
toothbrush. We did a search again and a long list of Colgate toothbrushes showed 
up (14 webpages with each page showing 20 products), and spent much time to 
compare and choose an appropriate one. Once we landed on the Colgate 1 Pack 
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toothbrush product page, it took us roughly 1.5 minutes to read through the product 
information on the page.  
Figure 2.1 shows an example of the shelf display of toothbrushes in one of 
the offline stores which provided data to us and a screenshot of the webpage during 
the search process in Amazon.com. As it can be seen from the figure, there are a 
large number of substitute products for toothbrushes on the shelf in the offline store. 
However, they are concentrated in a narrow section in the shelf and it is easy for 
the consumers to search and compare. In the online markets, repeating the search 
process for each of the substitute products can be a long and costly process. Thus, 
we posited that the online consumers have a higher search cost for substitute 
products’ attributes. 
2.2.3 Consumer Demand under Product Substitution 
We considered two common scenarios that trigger consumers to consider substitute 
products: the price increase of a product and a product stockout (e.g., Duan et al. 
2015, Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Smith and Agrawal 2000). We measured consumer 
demand resulting from the price changes by using the own-price elasticity and the 
cross-price elasticity, and we measured consumer demand resulting from the 
product stockouts by using the changes in market share of the substitute products 
when a product is out-of-stock1.  
Consider a price increase, the consumer may still buy the focal product that 
increases its price or buy a substitute product. Each option incurs different levels of 
                                                
 
1 The own-price elasticity, the cross-price elasticity and the changes in market share of the 
substitute products are measured for the focal store only as we do not observe the consumer 
demand at the competing stores. 
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search costs for the online and offline consumers, which has theoretical 
implications for the consumer demand evidenced by the own-price elasticity. The 
consumer’s response to the price increase depends on the search costs. Price 
increases will lead to lost demand for the focal product at the focal store when the 
consumer purchases a substitute product, resulting in a higher own-price elasticity 
and a higher cross-price elasticity. Hence, if a consumer can more easily choose a 
substitute product, the own-price elasticity will be higher. As discussed above, 
between online and offline markets, the search cost for substitute products’ 
attributes is higher online than offline. For the online consumers, given that search 
cost for substitute products’ attributes is high, typical consumers should choose to 
still buy the focal product. For the offline consumers, given that search cost for 
substitute products’ attributes is low, typical consumers should choose to buy a 
substitute product. Therefore, the price increase may result in a higher own-price 
elasticity and a higher cross-price elasticity in the offline market. Hence, we expect 
that both the own price-elasticity and the cross-price elasticity are higher offline 
than that online.  
When stockouts happen, a consumer cannot buy the unavailable product. 
As discussed above, the online consumers are less likely to purchase the substitute 
product since their search cost for substitute products’ attributes is higher, and the 
offline consumers are more likely to purchase the substitute product their search 
cost for substitute products’ attributes is lower. We expect that the changes in 
market share of the substitute products are greater in the offline markets than those 
in the online markets.  
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Table 2.1 summarizes the comparison of search cost components, our 
expected own- and cross-price elasticity, and the changes in market share of the 
substitute products under stockouts between online and offline markets. 
2.3 Empirical Context and Data 
We collect data from one of the largest supermarket chains in China from August 
8, 2011, to December 31, 2014. The supermarket chain had annual sales of $4.372 
Billion in 2011 and manages a network of supermarket stores across the country 
and an online store. We select the 34 offline stores and the online store that serve 
the Shanghai metropolitan area for our data collection. (Note that the online store 
only serves the Shanghai metropolitan area.) Both the online store and 34 offline 
stores are supplied by the same distribution center located in the rural area in 
Shanghai. Although the online retail markets were developing rapidly in China 
from 2011 to 2014, they were still much smaller than the offline retail markets. By 
the end of 2014, the online retail markets in China accounted for less than 10% of 
the total transactions of the whole retail industry in China3. 
 We select the toothbrush category for our analysis because toothbrush 
products are common consumer packaged goods that are in supply over a long-term 
and year-round (not products in the market for a few months and then discontinued, 
or in the market only for a few months a year). For the offline stores, we collected 
the Point-of-Sales (POS) data that consist of product information, sales price, sales 
                                                
 
2   Converted from figures in Chinese currency RMB. $1=RMB6.3 in July 2011 when the data 
were collected. This applies to all dollar calculations throughout the paper.  
3 National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201501/t20150120_671071.html (Accessed on August 27, 2017). 
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unit, and transaction time for each transaction. We also collect daily inventory data 
and wholesale price data for each stock keeping unit (SKU) in each store. There are 
98 toothbrush SKUs for the offline stores, but not every store carries every SKU. 
Due to the volume of our offline data4, we used a one-month period from August 
8th to September 8th, 2011 for our analysis. During the one-month period, 41,043 
consumers made 41,335 transactions on toothbrush products. For the online store, 
we also collected the POS data that include product information, transaction time, 
sales price, and sales unit for each transaction. The supermarket chain’s online store 
was at its early stage of development in 2011 and was only used as a complementary 
source of sales to the offline stores. Hence, the online data is much less than the 
offline data, including 1,418 consumers who made 1,998 transactions on 226 
toothbrush products. 
The supermarket chain sells toothbrush products of 5 brands in the offline 
stores and toothbrush products of 22 brands in the online store. We select the 
toothbrush brands with more than 10% of the market sale in the category and treated 
the remaining brands as the outside good. As a result, three toothbrush brands, Crest, 
Colgate, and 5A, were selected. These brands account for 90 SKUs and 97.56% of 
total sales in the category in the offline stores. Four brands, Colgate, Crest, Darlie, 
                                                
 
4 Note that we use discrete choice models to estimate consumer demand for all available products. 
Thus, the number of observations in our dataset is the number of transactions times the number of 
all available products for each transaction, which becomes far more than the number of 
transactions. For example, a customer purchased a product. Our data shows an observation for the 
transaction. We need to create additional observations for other products in the consideration set 
for which the customer did not buy. If the consideration set contains 9 products, the one 
observations becomes 9 observations. The raw data for the month have 41,355 transactions. After 
creating the data for other products in the consideration set, the number of observations becomes 
366,883. 
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and Lion, were selected. These brands account for 135 SKUs and 80.88 % of total 
sales in the online store. Toothbrush products are sold in various packaging sizes, 
and different packaging sizes use nonlinear pricing scheme (e.g., Crest 1 Pack is 
$1.37, Crest 2 Packs is $2.50). To compare products with different packaging sizes, 
we calculated the price as the weighted (by average monthly unit sales across the 
whole data period) average unit price. Table 2.2A presents the market share and the 
average unit price for each toothbrush product and brand in both the online and 
offline markets. We further collected the transaction history by the consumer 
including if the consumer has purchased the same product before, the total dollar 
amount the consumer has spent, and the number of purchases the consumer has 
made during the data collection period. Tables 2.2B and 2.2C present the consumer 
purchase history. 
Following Zipkin (2000), for the offline stores, we defined that a product 
stocks out when the product’s inventory is zero during a day. Using this definition, 
the average stockout rate is 0.07% (on average, products stockout in 7 out of 10,000 
days) for our data, much lower than the industry average stockout rate of 8% 
(Musalem et al. 2010). This is likely because of the potential discrepancy between 
system-recorded inventory and the actual inventory in the store (Musalem et al. 
2010). For example, the system shows 3 units in inventory, but the store is already 
out-of-stock. As a result, we treated a product as out-of-stock when its inventory 
hits its minimum inventory level during the year, and its sales are zero at the same 
time. For the online store, since we do not observe its inventory status, we assumed 
that a product is out-of-stock if it has no sales for a week. 
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To help better understand our data, Figure 2.2 presents the average unit 
prices, daily sales and stockouts of a sample product (Crest 2 Pack) in an offline 
sample store and the online store, respectively. It is interesting to note that the prices 
vary much more frequently in the online stores than those in the offline store, and 
the sales are negatively associated with prices.  
2.4 Model and Estimation 
2.4.1 The Econometric Model 
We derived consumers’ utility maximization behavior and specify a random 
coefficients multinomial logit (MNL) model to capture the discrete consumer 
choice over products. Discrete choice models have been used widely in the 
literature to analyze product substitution pattern with respect to price (e.g., 
McFadden 1973, Berry et al. 1995, Nevo 2001), brand equity (e.g., Degeratu et al. 
2000, Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001, Sriram et al. 2007), ranking (Ghose et al. 2012, 
Yang and Ghose 2010), and product availability (Musalem 2010, Bruno, et al. 
2008). We assume consumer i’s indirect utility to purchase product j in store s at 
time t is given by:   jkl+m = nl+okpqrstl+m + up!vwkl + xkl+m, (2.1) 
where nl is consumer i’s intrinsic preference of product j. pqrstl+m is the unit price 
of product j . p!vwkl  is a dummy variable with 1 indicating the consumer has 
purchased product j before, otherwise not. xkl+m  is the unobserved utility. We 
captured consumers' heterogeneous tastes for price by allowing ok to vary by the 
consumer’s total dollar amount of purchase !yz3{wk  and her number of 
purchases {3yk from August 8th, 2011, to December 31st, 2014, as follows: 
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ok = o + o*!yz3{wk + oI{3y"tqk + #k, (2.2) #k~{ 0, } . (2.3) 
 o is the mean price coefficient and } is the standard deviation of }k. 
There is potential endogeneity if pqrstl+m  is correlated with the 
unobserved utility xkl+m. The unobserved utility can arise from the product attributes 
that are observed by consumers but not observed by researchers, for example, the 
attractiveness of the package design and/or the quality of a product. Following Song 
and Chintagunta (2006), we used the wholesale price as an instrumental variable 
(IV) to deal with the endogeneity in the offline markets. The wholesale price 
reflects supply-side shocks, such as production cost, which is unlikely correlated 
with consumer demand. For the online store, since we do not have the information 
on the wholesale price, we constructed the average unit price for the products in the 
same brand but in different packaging sizes as an IV. The average unit price for the 
products in the same brand but in different packaging sizes is correlated with the 
unit price of the focal product as the manufacturer may use the same facilities for 
production and transportation. However, manufacturers may use different 
packaging sizes to price discriminate and segment consumers, and conduct 
independent pricing strategies for different packaging sizes, such that 
manufacturers do not consider the consumer demand for the other packaging sizes 
when setting the price for the focal product. In other words, the consumer demand 
for the products in different packaging sizes does not affect the pricing of the focal 
product. To purge out the correlation between the price and the unobserved utility, 
we used the control function approach (Petrin and Train 2010) as the nonlinearity 
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of the structural model makes it invalid to use traditional linear Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS). In detail, we decompose the unobserved utility to an unobserved 
error ~l+m, which is correlated with pqrstl+m and an error xkl+m that is uncorrelated 
with pqrstl+m and has i.i.d Type I extreme value distribution as follows:  xkl+m = ~l+m + xkl+m. (2.4) 
We specified the following projection of pqrstl+m on the IV: pqrstl+m = ϓ) + ϓ*Äl+m + Ål+m, (2.5) 
where ϓ) is the intercept and Äl+m is the IV for pqrstl+m. The IV is weighted (by 
average monthly shipment quantity) average unit wholesale price for the offline 
stores and is the average unit price of other products in the same brand for the online 
store. Ål+m  is the residual correlated with the unobserved error ~l+m . The control 
function is specified by projecting ~l+m on Ål+m: ~l+m = ÇÅl+m + Bl+m, (2.6) 
where Bl+m  has i.i.d standard normal distribution and is not correlated with pqrstl+m. Plugging (2.6) into (1), consumer i’s utility on product j becomes: jkl+m = nl+okpqrstl+m + ÇÅl+m + Bl+m + xkl+m. (2.7) 
Hence, conditional on Ål+m , pqrstl+m  is uncorrelated with the unobserved error xkl+m.  
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2.4.2 Estimation Procedure 
To estimate our model, we followed the control function approach by Petrin and 
Train (2010)5:  
Step 1: Run a linear regression of price on the IV and predict the residuals. 
Step 2: Plug in the predicted residuals into Equation (2.6) and use maximum 
simulated likelihood (MSL) to estimate the parameters. 
Our multinomial logit model specifies the following probability to purchase 
each product: 5kl+m= exp nl + okpqrstl+m + ÇÅl+m + Bl+m + xkl+m ・ [ exp	(nl + okpqrstl+m + ÇÅl+m + Bl+m + xkl+m)l ]Y*. (2.7) 
Since maximum-likelihood (ML) yields no closed form, we estimated our 
model by using maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) (Train 2003). We 
maximized the following simulated likelihood: 
L(θ)= ;A *^k 5kl+m, (2.8) 
where 5kl+m is the simulated probability of 5kl+m	and S is the number of simulation 
draws. We estimate both the online and offline demand separately and use 100 
Halton draws for each estimation (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, Train 2003). 
                                                
 
5 Alternatively, we can specify moment functions and use the method of simulated moments 
(MSM) to estimate parameters, but MSM would take a longer time to estimate than MSL 
(Gentzkow 2007). 
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2.5 Results and Analyses 
2.5.1 Estimation Results 
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results from the model. The coefficients for the 
intrinsic preference for each product, the consumer’s purchase history, and the 
mean price coefficient o  are of the expected signs. The intrinsic preference 
measures a consumer’s utility from purchasing a product: a higher intrinsic 
preference means the consumer receives more utility when she purchases the 
product compared to when she purchases the outside good. For the intrinsic 
preference estimates, most of them are positive and significant. For example, in the 
offline demand estimation, the largest coefficient for the intrinsic preference is on 
Colgate 1 Pack (n =4.57, p<0.001), and the smallest coefficient is on Crest 4 Pack 
(n = -0.67 but insignificant), suggesting that consumers are most likely to purchase 
Colgate 1 Pack as compared to the outside good and indifferent between purchasing 
Crest 4 Pack and the outside good. In the online demand estimation, the largest 
coefficient for the intrinsic preference is on Lion 2 Pack (n = 2.47, p < 0.001) and 
the smallest coefficient is on Darlie 3 Pack (n = -0.47 but insignificant), suggesting 
that consumers are most likely to purchase Lion 2 Pack as compared to the outside 
good and indifferent between purchasing Darlie 3 Pack and the outside good. The 
estimates of intrinsic preference parameters are in line with the relative market 
shares between products (e.g., 23.91% for Colgate 1 Pack and 0.01% for Crest 4 
Pack in the offline stores, and 17.55% for Lion 2 Pack and 3.52% for Darlie 3 Pack 
in the online store). 
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In the offline stores, whether the consumer has purchased the same product 
before does not have a statistically significant effect on the consumer’s utility on a 
product (e.g., the coefficient of p!vwkl  in the offline stores is 23.94, but 
insignificant). In the online store, however, the consumers’ utility on a product is 
positively related to their past purchase of the product (e.g., the coefficient of p!vwkl in the online stores is 8.02, p<0.001). Online consumers get a higher utility 
if they have purchased the product before, which is expected. 
The offline consumers’ tastes on prices depend on their total dollar amount 
of purchase and the number of purchases they have made during the data collection 
period. The coefficient of the total dollar amount of purchase in the offline stores 
is positive and significant (o = 0.05, p<0.001), implying the higher dollar amount 
the consumer has spent, the less price sensitive she is. The coefficient of the number 
of purchase in the offline stores is negative and significant (o =-0.08, p<0.001), 
implying the more purchases the consumer has made, the more price sensitive she 
is. The coefficients of the total dollar amount of purchase and the number of 
purchases are not statistically significant for the online consumers. The mean price 
coefficients in both online and offline estimations are negative and significant (o = 
-0.45, p < 0.001 for the offline demand estimation and o = -0.24, p < 0.05 for the 
online demand estimation), indicating that consumers’ utility decreases with the 
increase of the price. The standard deviations of price coefficients are also 
significant in both estimations (}  = 0.27, p < 0.001 for the offline demand 
estimation and } = 0.27, p < 0.001 for the online demand estimation), implying 
consumers have heterogeneous tastes on price. 
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2.5.2 Price Effect 
Because the estimation results of the structural model are not immediately 
interpretable (Cameron and Trivedi 2005), we compute the own- and cross-price 
elasticities using the estimates in Table 2.3 and the associated standard errors are 
estimated by taking the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameter oÜ , 
computing the statistic in question at each draw, and calculating the sample 
standard deviation (Berry et al. 1999, Nevo 2000). To separate the impact of 
consumer’s purchase history on the price elasticities, we forced the value of !yz3{wk and {3y"tqk to be zero.  Tables 4A and 4B present the results for the 
offline and online estimation, respectively. The diagonal numbers are the own-price 
elasticities, and the off-diagonal numbers are the cross-price elasticities. The results 
show that the demands for products in the offline stores are price-elastic (i.e., 
smaller than -1). The demands for almost half of the products in the online store is 
price-elastic (i.e., Colgate 1 Pack, Colgate 3 Pack, Crest 1 Pack, Crest 3 Pack, 
Darlie 3 Pack, and Lion 3 Pack) and the other half (i.e., Colgate 1 Pack, Colgate 3 
Pack, Crest 1 Pack, Crest 3 Pack, Darlie 3 Pack, and Lion 3 Pack) are price-inelastic 
(i.e., Colgate 2 Pack, Colgate 4 Pack, Crest 2 Pack, Darlie 1 Pack, Darlie 2 Pack, 
Lion 1 Pack, and Lion 2 Pack). For example, the own-price elasticity for Colgate 1 
Pack in the offline stores is -1.73 offline and is -1.10 online, indicating that a 1% 
increase in the price for Colgate 1 Pack results in 1.73% decrease in the demand 
offline and 1.10% decrease in the demand online. The results are in the similar 
ranges to the findings in the literature that the price elasticities are typically between 
-4 and 0 (e.g., Bijmolt et al. 2005, Ghose and Yao 2011, Granados et al. 2012). All 
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of the offline own-price elasticities are significant at the 5% significance level 
except Crest 2 Pack (-2.34 and insignificant), while a number of own-price 
elasticities (i.e., Colgate 2 Pack, Crest 2 Pack, Darlie 1 Pack, Darlie 2 Pack, Lion 1 
Pack, and Lion 2 Pack) are not significant at the 5% significance level in the online 
store.  
All cross-price elasticities are positive and significant in the offline stores 
(Table 2.4A), while a number of cross-price elasticities are not significant in the 
online store (Table 2.4B). All of the cross-price elasticities are smaller than 1 in 
both the online and offline stores. For example, in Table 2.4A, the offline cross-
price elasticity for Colgate 3 (row) on Crest 3 (column) is 0.38 and significant at 
the 5% significance level, suggesting that a 1% increase in the price for Colgate 3 
Pack results in 0.38% increase in the demand for Crest 3 Pack. Take the same 
example in the online store, the online cross-price elasticity for Colgate 3 (row) on 
Crest 3 (column) is 0.06 and significant at the 5% significance level, suggesting 
that a 1% increase in the price for Colgate 3 Pack results in 0.06% increase in the 
demand for Crest 3 Pack. The results show that the average own-price elasticity is 
larger in absolute value in the offline stores than that in the online store (i.e., -1.74 
offline vs. -0.87 online), and the average cross-price elasticity is larger offline than 
online (i.e., 0.17 offline vs. 0.04 online). These statistics demonstrate that the own-
price elasticity offline is, on average, 2 times as much as that online and that the 
cross-price elasticity offline is, and that the cross-price elasticity offline is, on 
average, 4.25 times as much as that online. We further conduct t-tests to statistically 
compare the own- and cross-price elasticity between online and offline estimations, 
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and obtain statistically significant results.  The t-test results are statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level, indicating higher own-price elasticities and 
cross-price elasticities offline than online. 
2.5.3 Stockout Effect 
To estimate the changes in consumer demand due to stockouts, we conduct 
counterfactual analyses using the estimates in Table 2.3. We simulate the stockouts 
by using the scenarios when a product is not available in the consumers’ 
consideration set. Table 2.5A and 2.5B present the absolute change in markets 
shares of substitute products following a stockout of the focal product. The diagonal 
cells are omitted as the focal out-of-stock products do not have any market share. 
The last column shows the original market share of the focal out-of-stock products. 
The off-diagonal cells are the stockout effects of the product in the row on the 
product in the column. In both online and offline stores, stockouts induce statically 
significant substitution to substitute products. For example, when Colgate 1 Pack 
is out-of-stock, Colgate 3 Pack increases its market share by 0.14% in the offline 
store, while by 0.05% in the online store. 
To compare the stockout effects between online and offline markets, we 
calculate the market shares recovered in substitute products and the market share 
recovered in common products carried by both online and offline store (Colgate 1 
Pack, Colgate 2 Pack, Colgate 3 Pack, Colgate 4 Pack, Crest 1 Pack, Crest 2 Pack, 
and Crest 3 Pack) following a product stockout. Table 2.6A and Table 2.6B present 
the results for the offline and online estimation, respectively. Offline market shares 
are recovered more in the common products than those online. For example, when 
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Colgate 1 Pack stocks out, 6.84% of the loss of the market share is recovered in the 
common products in the offline stores (summation of the market share recovered 
in Colgate 2 Pack, Colgate 3 Pack, Colgate 4 Pack, Crest 1 Pack, Crest 2 Pack, and 
Crest 3 Pack), while 5.86% is recovered in the common products in the online store. 
On average, 6.55% of the loss of the market share goes to the common products 
offline while 6.05% of the loss of the market share goes to the common products 
online. Table 2.7 summarizes our findings on the difference in consumer demand 
between online and offline markets. 
2.5.4 Economic Impact 
While the results are statistically significant, it is important to show that the results 
are also economically significant. We calculate the effects on revenue in dollars 
due to price increases in both offline and online stores. Because of the differences 
between online and offline sales, to be comparable, we assume that the total demand 
for all products is 10,000 units in either the offline stores or the online store and 
computed the dollar amount of revenue changes by using the statistics in Table 2.2 
and price elasticities in Table 2.4. Table 2.8A and 2.8B presents the changes in 
revenue in dollars due to a 10% price increase6 in the offline stores and the online 
store, respectively. The last column shows the change in the net revenue change in 
the common products at the store. According to Table 2.8A, in the offline stores, 
                                                
 6	$0.14 increase for Colgate 1 Pack, $0.13 increase for Colgate 2 Pack, $0.07 increase for Colgate 
3 Pack, $0.04 increase for Colgate 4 Pack, $0.11 increase for Crest 1 Pack, $0.17 increase for 
Crest 2 Pack, $0.06 increase for Crest 3 Pack, $0.07 increase for Crest 4 Pack, and $0.06 increase 
for 5A 1 Pack in the offline stores. $0.14 increase for Colgate 1 Pack, $0.12 increase for Colgate 2 
Pack, $0.08 increase for Colgate 3 Pack, $0.07 increase for Colgate 4 Pack, $0.15 increase for 
Crest 1 Pack, $0.14 increase for Crest 2 Pack, $0.07 increase for Crest 3 Pack, $0.11 increase for 
Darlie 1 Pack, $0.10 increase for Darlie 2 Pack, $0.05 increase for Darlie 3 Pack, $0.16 increase 
for Lion 1 Pack, $0.12 increase for Lion 2 Pack, $0.10 increase for Lion 3 Pack in the online store.	
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when Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush’s price increases by 10%, the revenue for the 
Colgate 1 Pack and the common products decreases by $295.69 and $125.93, 
respectively, while the revenue increases by $47.48 for Crest 1 Pack, $8.73 for 
Crest 2 Pack, and $34.80 for Crest 3 Pack. There are two interesting observations 
from the results. First, price increases may have detrimental impacts on the focal 
product’s revenue but the manufacturer may earn a higher revenue from other 
products in either online or offline stores. For example, Table 2.8B indicates when 
the price for Colgate 4 Pack increase by 10% in the online store, the Colgate brand 
increases revenue of $19.47 (summation of $8.17 increase for Colgate 1 Pack, 
$4.01 increase for Colgate 2 Pack, $6.12 increase for Colgate 3 Pack, and $1.17 
increase for Colgate 4 Pack). Second, the revenue loss from the price increases in 
a brand may be more than fully recovered by the revenue gain of the other brand in 
either online or offline markets, especially when the less popular product increases 
its price. For example, Table 2.8A indicates when the price for Crest 3 Pack 
increase by 10% in the offline store, the Crest brand loses revenue of $26.45 
(summation of $24.97 increase for Crest 1 Pack, $4.85 increase for Crest 2 Pack, 
and $56.29 decrease for Crest 3 Pack) but the revenues for the Colgate brand 
increases by $96.27, and the net revenue change in the common products at the 
offline stores is $69.81 increase.   
We further calculate the effects on revenue in dollars due to stockouts in 
both offline and online stores. Table 2.9A and 2.9B show the results for the offline 
stores and the online store respectively. The last column shows the net revenue 
change in the common products at the store. Both the manufacturers and the stores 
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are worse off by a product stockout. For example, when Colgate 3 Pack is out-of-
stock at the offline store, the Colgate brand loses revenue of $1070.54 (summation 
of $18.86 increase for Colgate 1 Pack, $7.51 increase for Colgate 2 Pack, $1109.88 
decrease for Colgate 3 Pack, and $12.97 increase for Colgate 4 Pack) but the 
revenues increase by $12.38, $2.13, and $ $21.57 for Crest 1 Pack, Crest 2 Pack, 
and Crest 3 Pack respectively. In this case, the net revenue change in the common 
products decreases by $1034.46. In the online store, when Colgate 3 Pack is out-
of-stock, the Colgate brand loses revenue of $308.23 (summation of $7.32 increase 
for Colgate 1 Pack, $3.48 increase for Colgate 2 Pack, $325.44 decrease for Colgate 
3 Pack, and $6.42 increase for Colgate 4 Pack) but the revenues increase by $4.60, 
$0.99, and $ $2.75 for Crest 1 Pack, Crest 2 Pack, and Crest 3 Pack respectively. 
In this case, the net revenue change in the common products decreases by $299.89. 
2.6 Consumer Welfare Analyses 
We estimate the changes in consumer welfare with respect to the price changes and 
stockouts and compare them between the online and offline stores. Previous 
literature has analyzed consumer welfare gains from the increased product variety 
on the Internet (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003), the introduction of online markets (Ghose 
et al. 2006; Ghose and Yao 2011), and the online auctions (Bapna et al. 2008). We 
use the compensation variation (CV), a standard welfare analysis approach, to 
calculate the changes in consumer welfare when the characteristics of a product 
(e.g., price) are changed, or a product is removed from the consumers’ 
consideration set (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The compensating variation is the 
amount that the budgetary allotment would have to increase or decrease to yield the 
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same level of utility as that attained prior to any change in consumers’ consideration 
set (e.g., the introduction of a new product, the removal of the existing product or 
the price change of a product): sj = táàâfä,ãà maxé jkl+m − táàâfä,ãà maxéh jkl+m , 
where táàâfä,ãà ∙  is the expected value over random error xkl+m  and random 
coefficient ok ; q  is consumers’ original consideration set and q′  is the 
consideration set after the change. With TIEV error xkl+m, an analytical solution for 
the above equation can be written as (Gentzkow 2007): 
táàâfä,ãà maxé jkl+m = tãà ;A 8êàâfäé ≈ 1v ;A 8êàâfäé^ . 
We convert CV to dollars by dividing by price coefficient ok , and computed 
standard errors for welfare estimates by taking 100 draws from the asymptotic 
distribution of the estimated price parameter  oÜ (Gentzkow 2007).  
Table 2.10 presents the changes in consumer welfare due to a 10% price 
increases or stockouts of a product. In the offline stores, all the price increases 
except the price increase of Colgate 4 Pack and Crest 4 Pack have a negative and 
significant effect on the consumer welfare. In the online store, price increases of 
most products have significant effects on decreasing consumer welfare. We further 
conduct the t-tests and the results show that the decreases in consumer welfare for 
the offline consumers are greater than those for the online consumers at the 5% 
significance level. For example, when Colgate 1 Pack increases its price by 10%, 
an offline consumer loses $0.03 on average, whereas an online consumer loses 
$0.01 on average, more than the offline consumer does. The results suggest that the 
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offline consumers are hurt more than the online consumers because the offline 
market is more concentrated on the common products carried by both online and 
offline markets. Stockouts do not have a significant effect in reducing consumer 
welfare in either online and offline markets.  
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we examine and compare consumer demand under product 
substitution when price changes or product stocks out between online and offline 
markets using a large-scale dataset on consumer packaged goods and a random 
coefficients discrete choice model.  
We find consumer demand differs under different search cost between 
online and offline markets. Specifically, the average own-price elasticity is -1.74 
offline vs. -0.87 online, implying price changes have a larger effect on the consumer 
demand in the offline market than that in the online markets. As we discussed 
earlier, the own-price elasticity is determined by the search cost for substitute 
products’ attributes. Because the search cost for substitute products’ attributes is 
lower in the offline markets, offline consumers are more likely to give up the 
product with higher prices and purchase substitute products and the own--price 
elasticity is higher in the offline market. This result provides empirical support to 
the study in the literature that also find that online markets have a higher own-price 
elasticity offline than online (Chu et al. 2008). 
In addition to the own-price elasticity, we find that the online cross-price 
elasticity is lower than the offline cross-price elasticity. The average online cross-
price elasticity is 0.04, and the average offline cross-price elasticity is 0.17; that is, 
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the offline cross-price elasticity is 4.25 times higher than the online cross-price 
elasticity. The statistics suggest that the offline consumers are 4.25 times more 
likely to buy substitute products than online consumers in a store. This is because 
the search cost for substitute products’ attributes is lower in the offline markets than 
that in the online markets. When the price of a product increases, consumers in the 
offline markets can easily search for substitute products, study and buy the 
substitute products. There have been very few studies in the literature that examine 
the cross-price elasticity online (e.g., Danaher et al. 2014, Ellison and Ellison 2009) 
and no studies, to our best knowledge, that compare the cross-price elasticity 
between online and offline markets. The paucity of the literature highlights the 
important contributions of our study.  
The other trigger for consumers to search for substitute products is product 
stockouts. From our analyses, we find that the average market share recovered in 
the common products is 6.55% offline when the focal product is out-of-stock, while 
the average market share recovered in the common products is 6.05% online; that 
is, offline consumers are more likely to purchase substitute products than online 
consumers when stockouts occur. For the online consumers, because their search 
cost for substitute products’ attributes in the same store is high, they are less likely 
to purchase substitute products. For the offline consumers, because their search cost 
for substitute products’ attributes in the same store is low, they are more likely to 
search for and buy substitute products from the same store. The intuition on 
consumer demand behind stockouts is similar to that for the cross-price elasticity. 
Our findings on the cross-price elasticity and product substitution under stockouts 
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in offline markets are consistent with Shocker et al. (2004) that the demand of the 
focal product depends on the other products’ attributes and availability. Our study 
extends the research on the product substitution regarding price, ranking, brand 
equity and product availability to both online and offline markets (e.g., Berry et al. 
1995, Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001, Ghose et al. 2012, Musalem 2010). More 
importantly, similar to the cross-price elasticity, as the first attempts at comparing 
the effect of product stockouts on consumer demand between online and offline 
markets, our study makes important contributions. 
Our results are not only statistically significant but also economically 
significant. Price increases may have a detrimental effect on the focal brand’s 
revenue but may have a positive effect to increase the focal brand’s revenue. 
Because of product substitutions, the price increase of the focal product increases 
the rival brand’s revenue. Interestingly, our analyses show that the losses from the 
price increases may be more than fully recovered from the increases in the rival's 
revenue. For every 10,000 units in sales in the offline stores, when the price 
increases by 10% for a product, the average change in revenue for substitute 
product is $14.24, and the average revenue change in the common products is $0.61 
(calculated as the average of the numbers in the last column using the results in 
Table 2.8A). For every 10,000 units in sales in the online store, when the price 
increases by 10% for a product, the average change in revenue for substitute 
product is $2.48, and the average revenue change in the common products is $11.15 
(calculated as the average of the numbers in the last column using the results in 
Table 2.8B).  
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Similar to the effect of the price increase, product stockouts have a positive 
effect to increase substitute products’ revenue. For every 10,000 units in sales in 
the offline stores, when a product is out-of-stock, the average increase in revenue 
for substitute products’ is $6.04, and the average revenue change in the common 
products is -$901.45 (calculated as the average of the numbers in the last column 
using the results in Table 2.9A). For every 10,000 units in sales in the online store, 
when a product is out-of-stock, the average increase in revenue for substitute 
products’ is $4.59, and the average revenue in the common products change is -
$543.02 (calculated as the average of the numbers in the last column using the 
results in Table 2.9B).  
While the stores may not be worse off when increasing the prices, through 
consumer welfare analysis, we find that consumers are hurt by price increases in 
the offline markets. In fact, the offline consumers are hurt more than the online 
consumers 7  because the offline market is more concentrated on the common 
products.  A larger portion of offline consumers is hurt by price increases, even 
though they are more likely to switch away from the product which increases its 
price. 
Our findings have a number of managerial implications. First, for online 
retailers, they should realize that the online markets are not responsive to purchase 
the substitute products. Online retailers are not able to satisfy consumer demand by 
substitute products when the focal product increases it price or goes out-of-stock, 
                                                
 7	Stockouts do not have significant effects on the consumer welfare. Through t-test, we showed 
that consumer welfare decreases more offline than online following a price increase.	
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therefore they may want to devise online pricing strategies and manage their 
inventory carefully in order to attract online consumers in the first place. Second, 
offline retailers need to consider not only the focal product but also substitute 
products when devising their pricing strategies. Third, from a manufacturer’s 
perspective, a price increase in one product may increase revenues in its other 
product. And the increase of the revenue may be more than the revenue loss in the 
product of a higher price. However, the manufacturers lose revenues and customers 
to rival brands following a product stockout, especially in the offline markets. One 
possible strategy to mitigate such a situation is that the manufactures should provide 
incentives for the retailers to keep their products in stock (Yao et al. 2010).  
Finally, our research has several limitations that may be considered in future 
research. First, we examine consumer demand for substitute products but do not 
study consumer demand for complementary products when price changes or a 
product is out-of-stock. Studies on consumers’ complementary choices are also 
important to expand our understanding of how consumer demand changes in 
different scenarios. Second, due to the limitation of our data, we could not examine 
the consumer demand in response to other demand-triggering variables such as 
advertising. Given that the online markets have different capacities in advertising 
from the offline markets (e.g., personalized advertising), it would be interesting to 
extend our model to research the effect of other demand-triggering events on 
consumer demand between online and offline markets. Finally, our study used the 
data collected from a supermarket chain for consumer packaged goods. Our 
findings should be generalized to other industry settings and other product 
59 	
categories with caution. Future studies may collect additional data from other 
industries and from other product categories to empirically study consumer demand 
in different markets.  
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Figure 2.1: Product Display for Toothbrush Products  
Offline Store Online Store 
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Figure 2.2: Prices, Sales and Stockouts of a Sample Product  
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Table 2.1: Search Costs, Price Elasticities and Stockouts 
Markets 
Search Cost 
for Substitute 
Products’ 
Attributes 
Own-Price 
Elasticity 
Cross-Price 
Elasticity 
Changes in 
Market Share 
of Substitute 
Products 
under 
Stockout 
Online High Low Low Low 
Offline Low High High High 
 
 
Table 2.2A: Unit Prices and Market Shares 
 Offline Stores Online Store 
 Average Unit 
Price ($) 
Market  
Share 
Average Unit 
Price ($) 
Market  
Share 
Colgate 1 Pack 1.37 23.91% 1.41 6.98% 
Colgate 2 Pack 1.25 6.91% 1.19 5.98% 
Colgate 3 Pack 0.65 15.76% 0.78 8.60% 
Colgate 4 Pack 0.43 7.60% 0.69 2.40% 
Colgate 0.95 54.18% 1.09 23.96% 
     
Crest 1 Pack 1.06 11.84% 1.48 2.35% 
Crest 2 Pack 1.66 2.74% 1.36 2.33% 
Crest 3 Pack 0.56 17.04% 0.67 10.93% 
Crest 4 Pack 0.72 0.01% - - 
Crest 1.04 31.63% 1.06 15.61% 
     
5A 1 Pack 0.63 11.75% - - 
Darlie 1 Pack - - 1.13 4.82% 
Darlie 2 Pack - - 0.95 9.80% 
Darlie 3 Pack - - 0.52 3.52% 
Lion 1 Pack - - 1.62 5.40% 
Lion 2 Pack - - 1.20 17.55% 
Lion 3 Pack - - 1.04 0.20% 
Other Brand(s) 0.63 11.75% 1.10 41.31% 
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Table 2.2B: Past Purchase by Product 
 Offline Stores Online Store 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Colgate 1 Pack 0.0007 0.03 0.009 0.09 
Colgate 2 Pack 0.0001 0.01 0.004 0.07 
Colgate 3 Pack 0.0005 0.02 0.009 0.09 
Colgate 4 Pack 0.0002 0.01 0.004 0.06 
Colgate 0.0004 0.02 0.007 0.08 
     
Crest 1 Pack 0.0002 0.01 0.0009 0.03 
Crest 2 Pack 0.00005 0.007 0.0009 0.03 
Crest 3 Pack 0.0007 0.03 0.01 0.12 
Crest 4 Pack 0 0 - - 
Crest 0.0003 0.02 0.007 0.08 
     
5A 1 Pack 0.0004 0.02 - - 
Darlie 1 Pack - - 0.006 0.08 
Darlie 2 Pack - - 0.02 0.15 
Darlie 3 Pack - - 0.003 0.05 
Lion 1 Pack - - 0.005 0.07 
Lion 2 Pack - - 0.06 0.23 
Lion 3 Pack - - 0.01 0.11 
Other Brand(s) 0.0004 0.02 0.02 0.14 
Note: Past purchase is a dummy variable with 1 indicating the consumer has 
purchase the product before, otherwise not. 
 
 
Table 2.2C: Consumer Purchase History 
  Offline Stores Online Store 
  N Mean Standard Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Amount 
of Purchase 41043 26.21 63.48 1418 5500.94 143152 
Number of 
Purchases 41043 6.89 12.52 1418 22.89 133.30 
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results 
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
  Offline Stores Online Store 
Intrinsic Preference α   
Colgate 1 Pack 4.57*** 1.21 
 (0.19) (0.84) 
Colgate 2 Pack 3.19*** 1.24 
 (0.19) (0.70) 
Colgate 3 Pack 2.82*** 0.45 
 (0.15) (0.49) 
Colgate 4 Pack 1.65*** 0.55 
 (0.11) (0.40) 
Crest 1 Pack 3.23*** 0.32 
 (0.18) (0.89) 
Crest 2 Pack 2.55*** -0.15 
 (0.18) (0.82) 
Crest 3 Pack 2.42*** 0.37 
 (0.12) (0.41) 
Crest 4 Pack -0.67  
 (0.60)  
5A 1 Pack 2.51***  
 (0.14)  
Darlie 1 Pack  0.51 
  (0.69) 
Darlie 2 Pack  1.00 
  (0.57) 
Darlie 3 Pack  -0.47 
  (0.34) 
Lion 1 Pack  0.77 
  (0.97) 
Lion 2 Pack  2.47*** 
  (0.72) 
Lion 3 Pack  1.38 
  (0.73) 
Past Purchase 23.94 8.02*** 
 (4308.60) (1.06) 
   
Price Coefficients   
Total Amount of 
Purchase 0.05*** -0.01 
 (0.004) (0.02) 
Number of Purchases -0.08*** 0.02 
 (0.005) (0.02) 
-0.45*** -0.24* 
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Mean Price 
Coefficient o (0.02) (0.12) 
Standard Deviation σ 0.27*** 0.27*** (0.02) (0.03) 
   
Model Statistics   
N 366,883 20,373 
Log Likelihood -84140 -3458 
χ2 66*** 97*** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
 
Table 2.4A: Offline Price Elasticities 
 Colgate1 Colgate2 Colgate3 Colgate4 Crest1 Crest2 Crest3 Crest4 5A1 
Colgate1 -1.73 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.19 0.37 0.39 0.38 
Colgate2 0.10 -2.08 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.14 
Colgate3 0.17 0.21 -1.55 0.40 0.26 0.14 0.38 0.33 0.36 
Colgate4 0.07 0.09 0.17 -1.28 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.17 
Crest1 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.21 -2.09 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Crest2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 -1.75 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Crest3 0.13 0.16 0.29 0.33 0.20 0.11 -1.45 0.26 0.29 
Crest4 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -2.09 0.01 
5A1 0.12 0.15 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.10 0.27 0.24 -1.66 
Note: The numbers are the effect of the row product on the column product. The 
numbers in bold and italic are significant at the 5% significance level.  
 
 
 
  
66
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.4
B
: O
nl
in
e 
Pr
ic
e 
E
la
st
ic
iti
es
 
  
C
ol
ga
te
1 C
ol
ga
te
2 C
ol
ga
te
3 C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
D
ar
lie
1 
D
ar
lie
2 
D
ar
lie
3 
Li
on
1 
Li
on
2 
Li
on
3 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
-1
.1
0 
0.
07
 
0.
10
 
0.
14
 
0.
11
 
0.
07
 
0.
12
 
0.
02
 
0.
07
 
0.
09
 
0.
02
 
0.
06
 
0.
08
 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
0.
06
 
-0
.8
8 
0.
07
 
0.
09
 
0.
08
 
0.
03
 
0.
08
 
-0
.0
2 
0.
04
 
0.
06
 
-0
.0
3 
0.
03
 
0.
05
 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
0.
05
 
0.
03
 
-1
.1
6 
0.
07
 
0.
06
 
0.
03
 
0.
06
 
0.
02
 
0.
04
 
0.
05
 
0.
01
 
0.
03
 
0.
04
 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
0.
08
 
0.
06
 
0.
09
 
-0
.8
4 
0.
10
 
0.
06
 
0.
11
 
0.
03
 
0.
06
 
0.
08
 
0.
03
 
0.
05
 
0.
07
 
C
re
st
1 
0.
05
 
0.
03
 
0.
05
 
0.
07
 
-1
.1
6 
0.
03
 
0.
06
 
0.
02
 
0.
04
 
0.
05
 
0.
01
 
0.
03
 
0.
04
 
C
re
st
2 
0.
02
 
0.
01
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
-0
.9
0 
0.
02
 
-0
.0
1 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
-0
.0
1 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
C
re
st
3 
0.
06
 
0.
04
 
0.
06
 
0.
09
 
0.
07
 
0.
04
 
-1
.1
2 
0.
02
 
0.
04
 
0.
05
 
0.
02
 
0.
04
 
0.
05
 
D
ar
lie
1 
0.
01
 
-0
.0
2 
0.
01
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
-0
.0
2 
0.
02
 
-0
.1
9 
-0
.0
1 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.0
2 
0.
00
 
D
ar
lie
2 
0.
06
 
0.
03
 
0.
06
 
0.
08
 
0.
07
 
0.
03
 
0.
07
 
0.
00
 
-0
.9
8 
0.
05
 
-0
.0
1 
0.
03
 
0.
05
 
D
ar
lie
3 
0.
02
 
0.
01
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
0.
01
 
0.
02
 
0.
00
 
0.
01
 
-1
.1
5 
0.
00
 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
Li
on
1 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
3 
0.
01
 
0.
03
 
0.
02
 
-0
.0
3 
0.
02
 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.0
2 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
1 
Li
on
2 
0.
20
 
0.
09
 
0.
22
 
0.
30
 
0.
24
 
0.
09
 
0.
26
 
-0
.0
9 
0.
13
 
0.
19
 
-0
.1
3 
-0
.7
8 
0.
16
 
Li
on
3 
0.
10
 
0.
06
 
0.
10
 
0.
14
 
0.
11
 
0.
06
 
0.
12
 
0.
01
 
0.
07
 
0.
09
 
0.
00
 
0.
06
 
-1
.0
3 
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 n
um
be
rs
 a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 ro
w
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 in
 b
ol
d 
an
d 
ita
lic
 a
re
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
at
 th
e 
5%
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
le
ve
l.
67
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.5
A
: O
ffl
in
e 
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
 d
ue
 to
 S
to
ck
ou
ts
 
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
C
re
st
4 
5A
1 
O
rig
in
al
 
M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
- 
0.
04
%
 
0.
14
%
 
0.
08
%
 
0.
06
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
12
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
10
%
 
23
.9
1%
 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
0.
04
%
 
- 
0.
06
%
 
0.
04
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
04
%
 
6.
91
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
0.
14
%
 
0.
06
%
 
- 
0.
30
%
 
0.
12
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
39
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
29
%
 
15
.7
6%
 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
0.
08
%
 
0.
04
%
 
0.
30
%
 
- 
0.
08
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
30
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
22
%
 
7.
60
%
 
C
re
st
1 
0.
06
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
11
%
 
0.
08
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
10
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
08
%
 
11
.8
4%
 
C
re
st
2 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
01
%
 
2.
74
%
 
C
re
st
3 
0.
12
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
39
%
 
0.
30
%
 
0.
11
%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
28
%
 
17
.0
4%
 
C
re
st
4 
0.
00
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
5A
1 
0.
10
%
 
0.
04
%
 
0.
29
%
 
0.
22
%
 
0.
08
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
27
%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
11
.7
5%
 
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 la
st
 c
ol
um
n 
sh
ow
s 
th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
s 
of
 th
e 
ou
t-o
f-
st
oc
k 
pr
od
uc
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 
ro
w
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 in
 b
ol
d 
an
d 
ita
lic
 a
re
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
le
ve
l. 
 
 
68
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.5
B
: O
nl
in
e 
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 D
em
an
d 
du
e 
to
 S
to
ck
ou
ts
 
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 C
ol
ga
te
2 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
D
ar
lie
1 
D
ar
lie
2 
D
ar
lie
3 
Li
on
1 
Li
on
2 
Li
on
3 
O
rig
in
al
 
M
ar
ke
t 
Sh
ar
e 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
- 
0.
05
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
06
%
 
0.
01
%
 0
.0
7%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
17
%
 
0.
09
%
 
6.
98
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
0.
05
%
 
- 
0.
03
%
 
0.
08
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 0
.0
4%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
11
%
 
0.
05
%
 
5.
98
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
0.
05
%
 
0.
03
%
 
- 
0.
09
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 0
.0
4%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
09
%
 
0.
05
%
 
8.
60
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
0.
17
%
 
0.
08
%
 
0.
10
%
 
- 
0.
11
%
 
0.
02
%
 0
.1
5%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
08
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
26
%
 
0.
14
%
 
2.
40
%
 
C
re
st
1 
0.
05
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
10
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 0
.0
4%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
10
%
 
0.
05
%
 
2.
35
%
 
C
re
st
2 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 
2.
33
%
 
C
re
st
3 
0.
07
%
 
0.
04
%
 
0.
04
%
 
0.
14
%
 
0.
04
%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
04
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
12
%
 
0.
06
%
 
10
.9
3%
 
D
ar
lie
1 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 0
.0
1%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 
4.
82
%
 
D
ar
lie
2 
0.
05
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
08
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 0
.0
4%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
10
%
 
0.
05
%
 
9.
80
%
 
D
ar
lie
3 
0.
02
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 0
.0
1%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
01
%
 
- 
0.
00
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
01
%
 
3.
52
%
 
Li
on
1 
0.
02
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 0
.0
1%
 
0.
00
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
00
%
 
- 
0.
04
%
 
0.
02
%
 
5.
40
%
 
Li
on
2 
0.
18
%
 
0.
11
%
 
0.
10
%
 
0.
26
%
 
0.
10
%
 
0.
03
%
 0
.1
3%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
10
%
 
0.
03
%
 
0.
04
%
 
- 
0.
17
%
 
17
.5
5%
 
Li
on
3 
0.
08
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
14
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
01
%
 0
.0
6%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
05
%
 
0.
01
%
 
0.
02
%
 
0.
17
%
 
- 
0.
20
%
 
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 la
st
 c
ol
um
n 
sh
ow
s t
he
 o
rig
in
al
 m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 o
f t
he
 o
ut
-o
f-
st
oc
k 
pr
od
uc
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 ro
w
 
pr
od
uc
t o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 in
 b
ol
d 
an
d 
ita
lic
 a
re
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
le
ve
l. 
 
 
69
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.6
A
: O
ffl
in
e 
M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
 R
ec
ov
er
ed
 fr
om
 S
to
ck
ou
ts
 
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 C
ol
ga
te
2 C
ol
ga
te
3 C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
C
re
st
4 
5A
1 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
- 
0.
32
%
 
2.
13
%
 
1.
66
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
07
%
 
2.
07
%
 
0.
04
%
 
1.
52
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
0.
73
%
 
- 
2.
12
%
 
1.
65
%
 
0.
60
%
 
0.
07
%
 
2.
06
%
 
0.
04
%
 
1.
52
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
0.
74
%
 
0.
32
%
 
- 
1.
72
%
 
0.
62
%
 
0.
07
%
 
2.
13
%
 
0.
04
%
 
1.
57
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
0.
74
%
 
0.
32
%
 
2.
18
%
 
- 
0.
61
%
 
0.
07
%
 
2.
13
%
 
0.
04
%
 
1.
56
%
 
C
re
st
1 
0.
73
%
 
0.
32
%
 
2.
13
%
 
1.
66
%
 
- 
0.
07
%
 
2.
07
%
 
0.
04
%
 
1.
52
%
 
C
re
st
2 
0.
73
%
 
0.
31
%
 
2.
11
%
 
1.
65
%
 
0.
60
%
 
- 
2.
05
%
 
0.
04
%
 
1.
51
%
 
C
re
st
3 
0.
74
%
 
0.
32
%
 
2.
19
%
 
1.
72
%
 
0.
62
%
 
0.
07
%
 
- 
0.
04
%
 
1.
57
%
 
C
re
st
4 
0.
73
%
 
0.
31
%
 
2.
11
%
 
1.
65
%
 
0.
60
%
 
0.
07
%
 
2.
05
%
 
- 
1.
51
%
 
5A
1 
0.
74
%
 
0.
32
%
 
2.
17
%
 
1.
70
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
07
%
 
2.
11
%
 
0.
04
%
 
- 
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 n
um
be
rs
 a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 ro
w
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 in
 
bo
ld
 a
nd
 it
al
ic
 a
re
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
le
ve
l. 
70
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.6
B
: O
nl
in
e 
M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
 R
ec
ov
er
ed
 fr
om
 S
to
ck
ou
ts
 
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 C
ol
ga
te
2 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
D
ar
lie
1 
D
ar
lie
2 
D
ar
lie
3 
Li
on
1 
Li
on
2 
Li
on
3 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
- 
0.
66
%
 
0.
70
%
 
2.
53
%
 
0.
76
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
4%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
12
%
 
1.
08
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
1.
22
%
 
- 
0.
70
%
 
2.
50
%
 
0.
75
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
3%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
10
%
 
1.
07
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
1.
22
%
 
0.
66
%
 
- 
2.
50
%
 
0.
76
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
3%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
11
%
 
1.
08
%
 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
1.
26
%
 
0.
67
%
 
0.
72
%
 
- 
0.
78
%
 
0.
17
%
 1
.0
8%
 
0.
17
%
 
0.
63
%
 
0.
21
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
16
%
 
1.
11
%
 
C
re
st
1 
1.
22
%
 
0.
66
%
 
0.
70
%
 
2.
51
%
 
- 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
3%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
11
%
 
1.
08
%
 
C
re
st
2 
1.
21
%
 
0.
65
%
 
0.
69
%
 
2.
48
%
 
0.
75
%
 
- 
1.
02
%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
60
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
09
%
 
1.
07
%
 
C
re
st
3 
1.
23
%
 
0.
66
%
 
0.
70
%
 
2.
53
%
 
0.
76
%
 
0.
16
%
 
- 
0.
16
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
12
%
 
1.
08
%
 
D
ar
lie
1 
1.
21
%
 
0.
65
%
 
0.
69
%
 
2.
48
%
 
0.
75
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
2%
 
- 
0.
60
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
09
%
 
1.
07
%
 
D
ar
lie
2 
1.
22
%
 
0.
66
%
 
0.
70
%
 
2.
49
%
 
0.
75
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
3%
 
0.
16
%
 
- 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
10
%
 
1.
07
%
 
D
ar
lie
3 
1.
21
%
 
0.
65
%
 
0.
69
%
 
2.
48
%
 
0.
75
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
2%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
60
%
 
- 
0.
19
%
 
2.
09
%
 
1.
07
%
 
Li
on
1 
1.
21
%
 
0.
65
%
 
0.
69
%
 
2.
48
%
 
0.
75
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
2%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
60
%
 
0.
20
%
 
- 
2.
09
%
 
1.
07
%
 
Li
on
2 
1.
24
%
 
0.
67
%
 
0.
71
%
 
2.
54
%
 
0.
77
%
 
0.
17
%
 1
.0
5%
 
0.
17
%
 
0.
62
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
- 
1.
10
%
 
Li
on
3 
1.
23
%
 
0.
66
%
 
0.
70
%
 
2.
52
%
 
0.
76
%
 
0.
16
%
 1
.0
4%
 
0.
16
%
 
0.
61
%
 
0.
20
%
 
0.
19
%
 
2.
12
%
 
- 
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 n
um
be
rs
 a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 ro
w
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 in
 b
ol
d 
an
d 
ita
lic
 a
re
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
at
 th
e 
5%
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
le
ve
l. 
 
 
 
71
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.7
: P
ri
ce
 E
la
st
ic
iti
es
 a
nd
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
Su
bs
tit
ut
io
n 
M
ar
ke
ts
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 O
w
n-
Pr
ic
e 
E
la
st
ic
ity
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 C
ro
ss
-P
ri
ce
 
E
la
st
ic
ity
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
 
R
ec
ov
er
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
C
om
m
on
 P
ro
du
ct
s u
nd
er
 
St
oc
ko
ut
 
O
nl
in
e 
-0
.8
7 
0.
04
 
6.
05
%
 
O
ff
lin
e 
-1
.7
4 
0.
17
 
6.
55
%
 
    
 
72
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.8
A
: O
ffl
in
e 
R
ev
en
ue
 C
ha
ng
es
 d
ue
 to
 P
ri
ce
 In
cr
ea
se
s 
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
N
et
 
C
ha
ng
e 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
-2
95
.6
9 
28
.9
3 
38
.6
4 
11
.1
9 
47
.4
8 
8.
73
 
34
.8
0 
-1
25
.9
3 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
32
.0
9 
-1
11
.4
4 
13
.9
5 
4.
20
 
16
.3
5 
3.
67
 
12
.7
5 
-2
8.
44
 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
56
.2
5 
18
.3
5 
-7
2.
46
 
13
.0
2 
32
.4
3 
6.
56
 
35
.8
7 
90
.0
1 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
21
.6
3 
7.
33
 
17
.3
0 
-1
3.
02
 
13
.5
6 
2.
47
 
17
.2
8 
66
.5
5 
C
re
st
1 
45
.6
6 
14
.1
9 
21
.3
9 
6.
73
 
-1
63
.4
9 
5.
40
 
19
.9
0 
-5
0.
20
 
C
re
st
2 
7.
76
 
2.
95
 
4.
05
 
1.
15
 
5.
03
 
-4
2.
10
 
3.
61
 
-1
7.
55
 
C
re
st
3 
41
.9
3 
13
.8
8 
29
.7
0 
10
.7
6 
24
.9
7 
4.
85
 
-5
6.
29
 
69
.8
1 
 N
ot
e:
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
10
,0
00
 u
ni
ts
 in
 sa
le
s a
s t
he
 m
ar
ke
t. 
Th
e n
um
be
rs
 ar
e t
he
 ef
fe
ct
s o
f a
 1
0%
 p
ric
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
ro
w
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t’s
 re
ve
nu
e 
in
 d
ol
la
rs
. R
ev
en
ue
 c
al
cu
la
tio
n 
is
 
ba
se
d 
on
 d
es
cr
ip
tiv
e s
ta
tis
tic
s i
n 
Ta
bl
e 2
.2
 an
d 
es
tim
at
es
 in
 T
ab
le
 2
.4
A
. T
he
 la
st
 co
lu
m
n 
sh
ow
s 
th
e 
ne
t c
ha
ng
e 
in
 re
ve
nu
e 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
on
 p
ro
du
ct
s a
t t
he
 st
or
e.
 
   
73
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.8
B
: O
nl
in
e 
R
ev
en
ue
 C
ha
ng
es
 d
ue
 to
 P
ri
ce
 In
cr
ea
se
s 
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
N
et
 
C
ha
ng
e 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
-2
0.
23
 
4.
67
 
7.
07
 
2.
29
 
3.
91
 
2.
08
 
8.
80
 
8.
59
 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
6.
19
 
2.
12
 
4.
67
 
1.
52
 
2.
62
 
1.
00
 
5.
93
 
24
.0
6 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
4.
99
 
2.
48
 
-1
8.
70
 
1.
21
 
2.
04
 
1.
10
 
4.
60
 
-2
.2
6 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
8.
17
 
4.
01
 
6.
12
 
1.
17
 
3.
45
 
1.
78
 
7.
98
 
32
.6
8 
C
re
st
1 
4.
84
 
2.
43
 
3.
58
 
1.
20
 
-9
.6
6 
1.
08
 
4.
49
 
7.
95
 
C
re
st
2 
1.
53
 
0.
56
 
1.
16
 
0.
38
 
0.
65
 
0.
22
 
1.
47
 
5.
97
 
C
re
st
3 
5.
65
 
2.
83
 
4.
18
 
1.
43
 
2.
33
 
1.
26
 
-1
6.
64
 
1.
05
 
 
N
ot
e:
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
10
,0
00
 u
ni
ts
 in
 s
al
es
 a
s 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f a
 1
0%
 p
ric
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
ro
w
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t’s
 
re
ve
nu
e 
in
 d
ol
la
rs
. R
ev
en
ue
 c
al
cu
la
tio
n 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
st
at
is
tic
s i
n 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
2 
an
d 
es
tim
at
es
 i
n 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
4B
. 
Th
e 
la
st
 c
ol
um
n 
sh
ow
s 
th
e 
ne
t 
ch
an
ge
 in
 re
ve
nu
e 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
on
 p
ro
du
ct
s a
t t
he
 st
or
e.
  
    
 
74
 
	
T
ab
le
 2
.9
A
: O
ffl
in
e 
R
ev
en
ue
 C
ha
ng
es
 d
ue
 to
 S
to
ck
ou
ts
 
 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
C
re
st
1 
C
re
st
2 
C
re
st
3 
N
et
 
C
ha
ng
e 
C
ol
ga
te
1 
-2
30
7.
00
 
4.
84
 
8.
80
 
3.
49
 
6.
57
 
1.
87
 
6.
64
 
-2
27
4.
78
 
C
ol
ga
te
2 
5.
30
 
-6
94
.4
7 
3.
83
 
1.
59
 
2.
59
 
0.
66
 
2.
94
 
-6
77
.5
5 
C
ol
ga
te
3 
18
.8
6 
7.
51
 
-1
10
9.
88
 
12
.9
7 
12
.3
8 
2.
13
 
21
.5
7 
-1
03
4.
46
 
C
ol
ga
te
4 
11
.3
9 
4.
76
 
19
.6
9 
-4
51
.1
9 
8.
26
 
1.
24
 
16
.6
7 
-3
89
.1
8 
C
re
st
1 
8.
48
 
3.
05
 
7.
41
 
3.
25
 
-8
78
.1
1 
1.
03
 
5.
82
 
-8
49
.0
7 
C
re
st
2 
1.
53
 
0.
49
 
0.
81
 
0.
31
 
0.
65
 
-3
21
.7
5 
0.
61
 
-3
17
.3
3 
C
re
st
3 
16
.5
9 
6.
74
 
25
.1
4 
12
.8
0 
11
.3
4 
1.
85
 
-8
42
.2
5 
-7
67
.8
0 
N
ot
e:
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
10
,0
00
 u
ni
ts
 in
 sa
le
s a
s t
he
 m
ar
ke
t. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 a
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 
st
oc
ko
ut
 i
n 
th
e 
ro
w
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
co
lu
m
n 
pr
od
uc
t’s
 r
ev
en
ue
 i
n 
do
lla
rs
. R
ev
en
ue
 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
st
at
is
tic
s i
n 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
2 
an
d 
es
tim
at
es
 in
 T
ab
le
 2
.4
A
. 
Th
e 
la
st
 c
ol
um
n 
sh
ow
s t
he
 n
et
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 re
ve
nu
e 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
on
 p
ro
du
ct
s a
t t
he
 st
or
e.
  
  
79 	
Table 2.9B: Online Revenue Changes due to Stockouts 
 Colgate1 Colgate2 Colgate3 Colgate4 Crest1 Crest2 Crest3 Net Change 
Colgate1 -1130.38 6.40 4.09 11.12 8.18 1.82 4.86 -1093.92 
Colgate2 7.55 -754.76 2.29 5.52 4.47 1.14 2.58 -731.21 
Colgate3 7.32 3.48 -325.44 6.42 4.60 0.99 2.75 -299.89 
Colgate4 23.38 9.80 7.55 -654.69 15.70 2.78 9.81 -585.67 
Crest1 7.73 3.59 2.43 7.03 -608.27 1.02 2.96 -583.51 
Crest2 1.86 0.99 0.56 1.36 1.10 -215.10 0.64 -208.60 
Crest3 10.27 4.63 3.25 9.82 6.62 1.32 -334.23 -298.32 
Note: Based on 10,000 units in sales as the market. The numbers are the effect of 
the stockout in the row product on the column product’s revenue in dollars. 
Revenue calculation is based on descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 and estimates in 
Table 2.4B. The last column shows the net change in revenue in the common 
products at the store.  
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Table 2.10: Changes in Consumer Welfare at Product-Level 
 Offline  Online 
 10% Price Increase  10% Price Increase 
 Absolute Change 
Percentage 
Change  
Absolute 
Change 
Percentage 
Change 
Colgate1 -$0.03 -4.69%  -$0.01 -2.49% 
Colgate2 -$0.01 -1.34%  -$0.01 -1.87% 
Colgate3 -$0.01 -2.25%  $0.00 -1.30% 
Colgate4 $0.00 -0.96%  $0.00 -2.74% 
Colgate -$0.05 -9.53%  -$0.02 -8.86% 
      
Crest1 -$0.01 -1.71%  $0.00 -1.29% 
Crest2 $0.00 -0.57%  $0.00 -0.46% 
Crest3 -$0.01 -1.71%  $0.00 -1.57% 
Crest4 $0.00 -0.05%  - - 
Crest -$0.02 -4.12%  -$0.01 -3.49% 
      
5A1 -$0.01 -1.61%  - - 
Darlie1 - -  $0.00 -0.75% 
Darlie2 - -  -$0.01 -1.58% 
Darlie3 - -  $0.00 -0.96% 
Lion1 - -  -$0.02 -6.26% 
Lion2 - -  -$0.01 -2.54% 
Lion3 - -  $0.00 -0.43% 
Local Brand(s) -$0.01 -1.61%  -$0.04 -12.53% 
Note: Numbers in bold and italic are significant at the 5% significance level. Local 
brand includes 5A offline, and other brands include Darlie and Lion online.  
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3. Are Complements Really Complementary? An Empirical Structural 
Estimation of Consumer Purchase Behavior across Product Categories 
3.1 Introduction 
Consumers purchase products from multiple categories during a shopping trip. 
Examples include families purchasing both toothbrushes and toothpastes which are 
complements-in-use that provide superior results when used together (Shocker et 
al. 2004). Understanding substitutability and complementarity of cross-category 
demand is of great importance to the retailers who determine the inventory level of 
different categories to maximize revenue and to the multicategory manufacturers 
who rationalize their pricing and supply chain strategies across product categories. 
The rationale is that a change in the marketing (e.g., pricing) and supply chain 
strategies (e.g., inventory policies) of one category may affect the demand for other 
categories through cross-category effect. 
Price and product availability are two factors that affect consumer purchase 
decisions regarding the focal products and other products. An increase in price is 
often related to a reduction in demand for the focal product with an increased price, 
and product stockout can result in loss of sales or backorders.  Price and product 
availability of the focal product may affect consumer demand for other product 
categories. For example, if laundry detergent and fabric softener are complements, 
and cake mix and cake frosting are complements, a price reduction on detergent 
may increase the sales of fabric softener, and stockout of cake mix may reduce the 
sales on cake frosting. Researchers have studied effects of various marketing mix 
variables (e.g., Manchanda et al. 1999, Song and Chintagunta 2006, Wedel and 
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Zhang 2004) and find cross-category effects on other product categories by 
changing marketing efforts on the focal category. For example, Song and 
Chintagunta (2006) find complementarity between softeners and detergents: a 
reduction in softener price increases demand for detergents. 
Despite the literature studying multicategory demand, the understanding of 
how product availability affects consumer purchase behavior across product 
categories is much limited. Specifically, does the product availability status of one 
category (e.g., toothbrush) affect demand for another category (e.g., toothpaste)? If 
there exists a cross-category effect, will stockouts in one category increase or 
decrease demand for other categories? Furthermore, how does the product 
availability status affect the demand for products of the same brand but other 
category and the demand for products of another brand and another category? For 
example, does the stockout of Colgate toothbrushes have different effects on the 
demand for Colgate toothpastes and the demand for Crest toothpastes?  
In this chapter, we address the above questions by using large-scale 
transaction level data from one of the largest supermarket chains in China. We 
apply a structural demand framework to examine consumer purchase behavior 
across two complements-in-use categories, toothbrush products and toothpaste 
products. Based on our estimation, we conduct counterfactual analyses on 
consumer response to price change and stockout. We find that consumers do not 
have superior utility to purchase toothbrushes and toothpastes together. Through 
cross-price elasticity computation, we find that most of the cross-category cross-
price elasticities are positive. This suggests products that are complements-in-use 
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may not be complements-in-purchase. We further conduct consumer welfare 
analyses and show that consumers are hurt by price increases.  
Our study makes a number of important contributions. First, our research is 
among the small stream of papers studying multicategory demand. Despite a rich 
body of literature on demand estimation where consumers choose a single product 
within a product category (e.g., Berry 1994, Berry et al. 1995, Nevo 2001), 
understanding of how consumers make purchase decisions of products across 
product categories are much limited (a review of multicategory demand models can 
be found in Seetharaman et al. (2005)). Second, our study is among the first papers 
to examine the effect of product availability in the context allowing multi-category 
consumer demand. Neglecting stockouts may lead to biases or incorrect managerial 
implications in structural models (e.g., Bruno and Vilcassim 2008, Conlon and 
Mortimer 2013, Musalem et al. 2010). Third, our Point-of-Sale (POS) data provides 
information on the products a consumer buying in each shopping trip that helps 
examine cross-category effects whereas most papers only use product-level 
aggregate data. Song and Chintagunta (2006) point out that joint purchase incidence 
probability during a shopping trip cannot be identified with aggregate level data as 
different joint purchase incidence outcomes can result in the same aggregate sales 
data in each category. Using transaction-level data, we directly observe whether 
consumers have made multicategory purchases and are able to uncover consumer 
purchase pattern during a shopping trip.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an 
overview of the relevant literature. Section 3.3 develops the structure model. 
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Section 3.4 details our empirical context and data. Section 3.5 discusses the 
estimation. Section 3.6 presents results. Section 3.7 presents the analysis of 
consumer welfare estimation. Finally, Section 3.8 discusses the results, theoretical 
and managerial implications, research limitations, and future research. 
3.2 Literature and Theory 
3.2.1 Marketing Mix and Multicategory Demand 
Multicategory demand has drawn increasing research attention. To capture cross-
category effect, a common measure is the cross-price elasticity the percentage 
change of demand for a product in one product category caused by a one percent 
change in the price of a product in another product category. Products are 
considered as complements if the reduction of the price of a product in one product 
category leads to an increase in sales of a product in another product category (e.g., 
Bucklin et al. 1998; Russell and Bolton 1988; Russell and Petersen 2000). While 
the price elasticity measures the inter-product relationships in demand, it cannot 
fully capture the richness of cross-category relationships, for example, the inter-
product relationships in use. Shocker et al. (2004) categorize the possible cross-
category relationships as substitutes-in-use, which serves similar purpose of usage; 
occasional substitutes, which may be used in a similar way for a higher-order 
purpose (e.g. granola can be placed at the breakfast section in a retail store but it 
can also be used as a substitute for snacks); complements-in-use; and occasional 
complements, which are intended to be used together to exert design influences on 
each other (e.g., the size of a briefcase should reflect the size and nature of other 
products to be contained). Shocker et al. (2004) argue that promotions can also 
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affect consumer purchase behavior across product categories. For example, the 
promotion on certain categories can induce store traffic and stimulate consumer 
occasionally substitute one category (granola) for another (cookies).  
Manchanda et al. (1999) use household scanner data and study consumer 
purchase on four product categories: cake mix, cake frosting, detergent, and fabric 
softener, among which cake mix and cake frosting, detergent and fabric softener 
are complements-in-use pairs. They find significant complementarity regarding 
price and promotion: the price reduction and/or promotion of one product category 
increases the demand for the other product category. The complementarity is 
stronger between cake mix-cake cake frosting pair than that between detergent-
fabric softener pair. Lee et al. (2013) also use household scanner data and studied 
the consumer multicategory demand for milk and cereal. In their empirical direct 
utility model, Lee et al. (2013) assume a superadditive utility structure for 
complementary products that favors purchases of products in both categories than 
purchases of either product in a category. That is, consumers obtain higher utilities 
when purchasing both milk and cereal than the summation of the utilities of either 
milk or cereal. Their findings suggest significant yet asymmetric complementary 
cross-category effects of price and promotion between milk and cereal: the effects 
of milk price and/or promotion on cereal are larger than those of cereal on milk.  
Song and Chintagunta (2006) argue that store-level data are sufficient to 
study multicategory demand for the purpose of pricing and category management. 
They investigate consumer purchase behavior across four laundry categories using 
weekly product-store level data and proposed a model where consumers maximize 
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their utility by purchasing either one product or products from different categories. 
They find complementarity regarding price and promotion between the liquid 
softener-liquid detergent pair and between the liquid softener-powdered detergent 
pair but not between liquid/powdered detergent-liquid/sheet softener pairs. The 
advantage of Song and Chintagunta (2006)’s model is that they extend standard 
discrete choice model to allow consumer multicategory purchase decisions so that 
they are able to estimate complementarity with respect to price across categories. 
By contrast, choices of a single product or an outside good is allowed in standard 
discrete choice models, thus only the substitutability can be estimated. Using a 
model similar to Song and Chintagunta (2006)’s model that allows cross-category 
demand, we apply our structural model estimation to transaction-level data. 
Compared to Song and Chintagunta (2006), the transaction-level data allow us to 
directly observe cross-category purchases, thus we are able to uncover consumer 
purchase behavior across categories in a shopping trip, which cannot be analyzed 
at the aggregate level. For example, Song and Chintagunta (2006) cannot observe 
cross-category purchases in a shopping trip, thus different multicategory demand 
at consumer level can result in same aggregate multicategory demand at the store 
level. We apply our model to study consumer purchase behavior across 
complementary-in-use categories toothbrushes and toothpastes and examine 
the cross-category complementarity regarding price during a shopping trip. 
3.2.2 Product Availability and Multicategory Demand 
There is limited yet increasing number of literature to study how product 
availability affects consumer purchase behavior. On one hand, consumers may 
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choose to buy other available products when a product is out-of-stock (e.g., 
Corstjens and Corstjens 1995, Musalem et al. 2010, Vulcano et al. 2012). On the 
other hand, the availability of the focal product may increase consumer demand for 
other products (Shocker et al. 2004). For example, consumers may purchase 
Colgate toothbrushes to pair with Colgate toothpastes.  
Musalem et al. (2010) study consumer substitution pattern within a product 
category when a product stockouts. They use daily sales data of shampoo products 
and derived consumer purchase likelihoods given different product availability 
statuses. They find evidence of important biases in model parameters without 
accounting for product availability, especially when stockouts are frequent. Conlon 
and Mortimer (2013) use exact product availability information on a network of 
vending machines and estimated consumer substitution pattern when products 
stockout. They also report evidence of bias in sales prediction and consumer 
substitution pattern by ignoring stockouts. Specifically, they report a 32% larger 
negative stockout effect on profit by using a model that accounts for stockouts than 
that by using models that do not consider stockouts. Biases or incorrect managerial 
implications in structural models are also reported in other literature when 
neglecting stockouts (Bruno and Vilcassim 2008, Conlon and Mortimer 2013, 
Musalem et al. 2010). 
While the above literature has studied consumer substitution pattern within 
a product category, to the best of our knowledge, none has examined the cross-
category effect of product availability. Despite the research in one product category, 
Kim et al. (2002) propose a random utility structural model that allows consumers 
88 	
to purchase more than one product in a category. They study consumers’ trade-off 
between price and product variety across different yogurt flavors by using 
household-level data. Though they do not observe product availability, they 
conduct counterfactual analyses on consumer response to the absence of each 
yogurt flavor and suggest that consumers need to be compensated by price 
reduction following a reduction in product variety. In this chapter, we leverage the 
information on product availability in our data and apply a random coefficients 
discrete choice model to examine the effect of product availability on consumer 
multicategory demand. Based on our estimation result, we conduct counterfactual 
analyses on consumer response to product stockout within and across product 
categories. 
3.3 The Model 
3.3.1 The Setup 
Following Song and Chintagunta (2006), we develop a multicategory choice model 
that allows consumer demand to depend on utilities from two categories. We 
assume consumer i’s utility of purchasing a single product j in store s at time t is   !"#$,&' = )&'+*"&+,-./#$,&' , (3.1) 
where )' is consumer i’s intrinsic preference of product j. +,-./#$,&' is the price 
of product j in category 0 ∈ {1,2} . Let toothbrush products 067 ∈ 06 ={0, 061, 062, … , 06:6}  be in category 1 and toothpaste products 0;7 ∈{0, 0;1, 0;2, … , 0;:;} be in category 2. :6and :; are the number of products in the 
two categories respectively. We capture consumers' heterogeneous tastes for price 
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by allowing *"&  to vary across consumers and categories around its population 
mean *& and variance <'& as follows: *"&~: *&, <& . (3.2) 
We model multicategory demand as a bundle choice, where a consumer can 
choose one product from either category or one from both categories. When there 
are :6  products in category 1 and :;  products in category 2, the number of 
potential bundles is (:6 + 1)(:; + 1). We assume consumer i’s utility of a bundle 
choice B ∈ C is D"#$,E = !"#$,E + F"#$,E = G6!"#$,&H'+G;!"#$,&I' + G6G;J(067, 0;7) +F"#$,E , (3.3) 
where and F"#$,E  is the unobserved utility and J(067, 0;7)  is the additional 
(dis)utility that consumers get if purchase both the product 067 in the category 1 and 
the product 0;7  in the category 2. G6  is a dummy variable with 1 indicating a 
consumer has purchased a product in the category 1 and 0 otherwise. G; is a dummy 
variable with 1 indicating a consumer has purchased a product in the category 
category 2 and 0 otherwise. In our baseline specification, we will allow J(067, 0;7) 
to flexibly vary by 067  and 0;7 . Assuming a simple two-product case where 
consumers can choose neither, either category or both categories. In this case, 
Gentzkow (2007) and Berry et al. (2016) have proved that the two categories are 
complements-in-purchase, that is the cross-price elasticities are negative if J(067, 0;7) is positive. The two categories are substitutes-in-purchase, that is the 
cross-price elasticities are positive if J(067, 0;7)	 is negative. The two products are 
independent, that is the cross-price elasticities are zero if J(067, 0;7) is zero. 
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Substituting (3.1) into (3.3), consumer i’s utility of purchasing bundle b 
becomes D"#$,E = G6()&H' + *"&H+,-./#$,&H') + G;()&I' + *"&I+,-./#$,&I')+ G6G;	J(067, 0;7) + F"#$,E (3.4) 
The probability that consumer i purchases product B is  
+LMB"#$,E = exp	(!"#$,E)exp	(!"#$,EQ)EQ∈R . (3.5) 
The probability that consumer i purchases product 7 is  
+LMB"#$,&' = exp	(!"#$,E)E∈RSTexp	(!"#$,EQ)EQ∈R . (3.6) 
3.3.2 Price Elasticities 
In the following, we focus on price elasticities of demand during a shopping trip. 
We drop subscript U and V for convenience without loss of generality. We consider 
price elasticities of demand of three types: 1) the own-price elasticity, 2) the cross-
price elasticity within the category, and 3) cross-price elasticity between the 
categories. The price elasticity is defined as  
W&',&Q'Q = X+LMB&' ∙ +,-./&Q'QX+,-./&Q'Q ∙ +LMB&' 	
=
+,-./&Q'Q+LMB&' *"&+LMB"&' 1 − +LMB"&' G[ *"&H, *"&I 																															\]	7 = 7^,− +,-./&Q'Q+LMB&' *"&Q+LMB"&'+LMB"&'QG[ *"&H, *"&I 															\]	7, 7^ ∈ 06	ML		7, 7^ ∈ 0;,+,-./&Q'Q+LMB&' *"&Q +LMB"&',&'Q − +LMB"&'+LMB"&'Q G[ *"&H, *"&I 										MVℎ`La\U`,
 
(3.7) 
where 
+LMB&' = bcd	(efg)g∈hSTbcd	(efgQ)gQ∈h G[(*"&H, *"&I), (3.8) 
91 	
and +LMB&',&Q'Q is the probability that consumer \ purchases both products 07 and 0^7^. The first line is the own-price elasticity. The second line is the cross-price 
elasticity within the product category. In the following, we analyze the sign of the 
elasticities. Consumers’ heterogeneous tastes of prices *"&H and *"&I are expected 
to be negative, therefore the own price elasticity is expected to be negative: a higher 
price of product 07  reduces the utility consumers get from bundles containing 
product 07 and thus reduces the demand for the product 07. If *"&H  and *"&I  are 
negative, the cross-price elasticity of two products within a product category is 
positive, that is the competing varieties within a product category are substitutes 
during a shopping trip. The last line is the cross-price elasticity between the two 
categories. Compared with the cross-price elasticity within the category, the cross-
price elasticity between two categories carries an additional term 
ijklmSQTQinoEST *"'Q+LMB\07,0′7′G[ *"&H, *"&I , the probability of consumers choosing the 
bundle containing both products  07 and 0^7^. The sign and magnitude of the cross-
price between categories are not guaranteed and depend on the comparison between 
the additional term +LMB"&',&Q' and +LMB"&'+LMB"&Q'. 
Consider a simple two-product case where consumers can only choose from 
two products j and k, with each product from different product categories. The 
difference between the additional term +LMB"',q − +LMB"'+LMB"q becomes `efTrefsrt ',q − `efT`efs1 + `efT + `efs + `efTrefsrt ',q ;. 
If J = 0 , the cross-price elasticity between two categories becomes zero and 
products j and k are independent. If J > 0, +LMB"',q > +LMB"'+LMB"q and products 
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j and k are complements. If J < 0, and +LMB"',q < +LMB"'+LMB"q and products j 
and k are substitutes.  
It becomes complex when there are multiple products within each category. 
Suppose there are two products 76 and 7; in the category of 06, and there is only one 
product w in the category of 0;. The set of bundles that consumers can choose from 
is {0, 76, 7;, w, 76, w , (7;, w)} . The difference between +LMB"'H,q  and +LMB"'H+LMB"q becomes `efTHrefs ∙ `t 'H,q + `efTIrt 'H,q − 1 − `efTIrt 'I,q1 + `efTH + `efTI + `efs + `efTH,s + `efTI,s ; . (3.9) 
Clearly, the cross-price elasticity of demand between categories for product x 
regarding the price of product w does not only depend on the direct (dis)utility 
between product 76 and product w, but also the (dis)utilities of all possible pairs of 
product w . Assume !'H = 5, !'I = 6, !q = 4, J 76, w = −2, J 7;, w = −1. The 
disutility comes in as consumers may have different shopping cycle of products in 
different categories. The numerator of equation (3.9) becomes   `t 'H,q + `efTIrt 'H,q − 1 − `efTIrt 'I,q = `|; + `} − 1 − `~ < 0. 
Hence, the cross-price elasticity of demand between categories for product 76 
regarding the price of product w in equation (3.9) is positive, indicating product 76 
and product w are substitutes. This can happen if consumers get a lower utility to 
purchase both categories together. When one category increases its price, 
consumers become more reluctant to purchase both categories together and switch 
to the other category. 
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Consider another case when consumers still have disutility of purchasing 
products in both product categories: !'H = 5, !'I = 6, !q = 4, J 76, w =−1, J 7;, w = −3 `t 'H,q + `efTIrt 'H,q − 1 − `efTIrt 'I,q = `|6 + `~ − 1 − `Ä > 0. 
Hence, the cross-category cross-price elasticity of demand for product 76 regarding 
the price of product w  in equation (3.9) is negative, indicating product x  and 
product w are complements even though consumers have subadditive utility when 
purchasing product 76 and product w together. Zhou (2014) suggests a joint-search 
effect when the cost of search is incurred jointly for all products (e.g., consumers 
can easily examine the products once they are at the store). As a result, the 
intrinsically independent products can be priced like complements. Berry et al. 
(2016) has shown that independent or even competing products can be 
complementary if other products exhibit superadditive utilities. One example is that 
consumers may prefer one-stop shopping than to make purchases at different stores. 
With more than one product to choose from a product category, the substitutability 
of products does not only depend on their direct interaction in utility within a bundle 
but also their indirect interaction via other products (Gentzkow 2007, Ogaki 1990, 
Samuelson 1974).  
3.3.3 Stockout Effect 
The change in the market share of product 7  following the stockout of 
product 7^ is defined as 
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Å = +LMB&'^ − +LMB&'
=
− +LMB"&'G[ *"&H, *"&I 																																																																																																											\]	7 = 7^,exp !"EB∈C07exp !"EE∈R − exp !"EE∈RSTQ − +LMB"&' G[ *"&H, *"&I 	\]	7, 7^ ∈ 06	ML		7, 7^ ∈ 0;,exp !"EB∈C07 − exp	(!"&',&'Q)exp !"EE∈R − exp !"EE∈RSTQ − +LMB"&'		 G[ *"&H, *"&I 																				MVℎ`La\U`,
 
where +LMB&'^  is the probability that product 7 is purchased following the stockout 
of product 7^. The first line is the loss of market share when product 7 itself is out-
of-stock. The second line is the change in the market share product 7 following the 
stockout of another product 7^ in the same product category. The second line is 
expected to be positive because 
bcd ÇfÉÑ,gT∈gbcd ÇfÉÑ,gg | bcd ÇfÉÑ,gs∈g > bcd ÇfÉÑ,gT∈gbcd ÇfÉÑ,gg , 
suggesting that the loss of market share should be recovered by the products in the 
same product category. The third line is the change in the market share following 
the stockout of a product in the other product category. Similar to the cross-category 
cross-price elasticity, the comparison between 
bcd efgB∈C07 |bcd	(efST,STQ)bcd efgg∈h | bcd efgg∈hSTQ  and +LMB"&' 
depends on the direct interaction between product 7  and product 7^  and their 
indirect interaction via other products. There can be positive or negative changes in 
the market share of products in other categories.  
3.4 Empirical Context and Data 
We collect data from one of the largest supermarket chains in China from August 
8, 2011 to December 31, 2014. The supermarket chain has annual sales of $4.37 
billion in 2011. It operates a network of 34 supermarket stores located in Shanghai 
metropolitan area. A distribution center located in the rural area in Shanghai 
supplies all 34 supermarket stores.  
95 	
In this chapter, we focus on consumer packaged goods and studied 
consumer demand across product categories. We collect POS data for two 
complements-in-use categories: toothbrush and toothpaste. Toothbrushes and 
toothpastes are chosen because they are common consumer packaged goods that 
are in supply over a long-term and year-round (not the products on the market for 
a few months and then discontinued, or on the market only for a few months a year), 
which helps us to focus on consumer demand for mature products. The POS data 
consist of detailed information on each transaction, including the amount bought 
and the price paid by SKU and transaction time. We have daily inventory data for 
each SKU in each store, which help us to directly measure product availability. 
Additionally, we have order and shipment data including the wholesale price paid 
by each store to the distribution center. 
We select consumer transactions with purchases of either a toothbrush or a 
toothpaste product from August 8th, 2011 to September 8th, 2014. In this time period, 
the data record 190,872 transactions made by 186,159 consumers. We focus on 
consumer choices of brands with more than 10% of market shares in toothbrush 
and toothpaste categories separately and treat the remaining brands as outside good. 
Three brands, Crest, Colgate, and 5A, account for 90 SKUs and 97.56% of total 
sales in the toothbrush category; and four brands, Crest, Colgate, Shanghai and 
Zhonghua, account for 163 SKUs and 94.67% of total sales in the toothbrush 
category. 5A, Shanghai, and Zhonghua are local brands sold in China and only 
specialize in one product category (i.e., 5A specializes in toothbrush products. 
Shanghai and Zhonghua specialize in toothpaste products). Products are sold in 
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various package sizes. Different package sizes follow a nonlinear pricing scheme 
that may affect consumer purchase behavior (Hendel and Nevo 2006). We treat 
different package sizes as different products and assume consumers derive their 
utility from different brand-size combinations. We operationalize the price as the 
weighted (by average monthly unit sales of all SKUs in the brand-size combination 
during the whole data period) average unit price per toothbrush or per 100g 
toothpaste. Products are later referred to as brand-size combination in this chapter. 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics on the average unit prices and relative 
market shares of products. Table 3.2 shows the number of transactions in which 
consumers purchased either toothbrush, toothpaste or both products. Transactions 
with a single product are more prevalent than those with products from both product 
categories. In particular, only 6.49% transactions involve purchases of both 
categories, smaller than the percentage of outside good transactions. To further 
investigate the joint purchase of a toothbrush and a toothpaste, we run ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions of a product’s daily sales quantity on the average price 
of the other category. There is potential endogeneity if the price is correlated with 
unobserved product attributes. For example, the attractiveness of the package 
design or the quality of a product may be correlated with both prices and consumer 
demand. These product attributes can be observed by consumers but not by the 
researchers. Following Song and Chintagunta (2006), we use the wholesale price 
as an instrumental variable (IV) to deal with the endogeneity. The wholesale price 
reflects supply-side shocks, such as production cost, which is unlikely correlated 
with consumer demand. Table 3.3 presents both OLS and IV estimation results. 
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None of the price coefficients is significant, offering no evidence on either 
complementarity or substitutability between the toothbrush and the toothpaste 
categories. Figure 3.1 presents the average unit price, daily sales and stockout of a 
sample product (Crest 4 Pack) in a sample store. The price varies from time to time 
and daily sales move opposite to the price: when the price is low, there are more 
sales. To deal with the endogeneity of the price, we use wholesale price as IV. 
Wholesale price provides supply-side shocks, such as the production cost, that is 
unlikely to correlate with consumer demand. The IV is weighted (by average 
monthly shipment quantity in the whole data period) average unit wholesale price. 
3.5 Estimation 
The nonlinearity of the structural model makes it invalid to use traditional linear 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to control for endogeneity. We adopt the control 
function approach (Petrin and Train 2010) to purge out the correlation between 
price and the unobserved component of the indirect utility. We decompose the 
unobserved component F"#$,E  into an unobserved error W"#$,E , which is correlated 
with price and an error F"#$,E, which is uncorrelated with price and has i.i.d Type I 
extreme value distribution as follows,  F"#$,E = W"#$,E + F"#$,E. (3.10) 
We specify the following projection of +,-./#$,'H  on the instrumental variable Ö#$,'H,  +,-./#$,&' = Üá + Ü6Ö#$,&' + à#$,&', (3.11) 
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where Üá is the intercept and Ö#$,&' is the IV for +,-./#$,&'. à#$,&' is the residual 
correlated with the unobserved error W"#$,E . The control function is specified by 
projecting W"#$,E on à#$,&H' and à#$,&I', W"#$,E = â6G6à#$,&H' + â;G;à#$,&I' + ä"#$,E, (3.12) 
where ä"#$,E has i.i.d standard normal distribution and is not correlated with prices. 
Plugging (3.12) into (3.4) D"#$,E = G6()&H' + *"6+,-./#$,&H' + â6à#$,&H') + G;()&I'+ *";+,-./#$,&I' + â;à#$,&I') + ä"#$,E + F"#$,E. (3.13) 
Hence, conditional on à"#$,E, +,-./#$,'H and +,-./#$,'I are uncorrelated with the 
unobserved error. 
The control function approach consists of two steps.  
Step 1: Run linear regressions of price on IV for toothbrush and toothpaste 
separately according to equation (3.11). Predict the value of the residuals.  
Step 2: Substitute à#$,'H  and à#$,'I  with the predicted residuals à#$,ãH  and à#$,ãI  into Equation (3.13) and use maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) to 
estimate the parameters. 
We treat outside good as our base group and normalize the utility of 
purchasing outside good to zero. The natural way to estimate a structural model like 
ours is to use maximum-likelihood to maximize the following log-likelihood: 
L(Θ)= çé +LMB"#$,E G[ *"6, *";"$# , (3.14) 
where Θ is a vector of all model parameters. However, there is no closed form 
solution for Equation (3.14). We, therefore, estimate our model by maximum 
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simulated likelihood (Train 2003). We maximize the following simulated log-
likelihood: 
L(Θ)= çé 6è +LMBê#$,Eè ,"$#  (3.15) 
where +LMBê#$,E is the simulated probability for +LMB"#$,E	and S is the number of 
simulation draws. We use 100 Halton draws of *"6 and *"; for the estimation. The 
Halton draws have two desirable features (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, Train 2003): 
1) they give fairly even coverage over sampling distribution domain, which makes 
the simulated probabilities vary less than those generated with random draws, and 
2) the draws for an observation are created to fill in the spaces left empty by the 
previous observations, which provides a better coverage than random draws. 
3.6 Estimation Results 
Table 3.4 presents the estimation results. The intrinsic preference measures a 
consumer’s utility of purchasing a product: a higher intrinsic preference means a 
higher utility. Most of the intrinsic preference estimates are negative because the 
data show that consumers are more likely to choose the outside option than bundles 
containing a certain product. This is because the outside option accounts for 14.84% 
purchase incidents. Among toothpaste products, the largest coefficient of the 
intrinsic preference is that of Colgate Medium Pack toothpaste () =0.39, p<0.001), 
and the smallest coefficient is that of Shanghai Small Pack toothpaste () = -2.45, 
p<0.001). Among toothbrush products, the largest coefficient of the intrinsic 
preference is that of Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush ()  =-0.08 but not statistically 
significant), and the smallest coefficient is that of Crest 4 Pack toothbrush () = -
4.55, p<0.001). The estimates of intrinsic preference parameters are partially 
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identified by the relative market shares in each product category (e.g., 20.70% for 
Colgate Medium Pack toothpaste, 2.38% for Shanghai Small Pack toothpaste in 
toothpaste category, 25.70% for Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush and 0.01% for Crest 4 
Pack toothbrush in the toothbrush category). 
All J’s are negative and statistically significant at the 5% significance level, 
suggesting consumers obtain subadditive utilities when purchase toothbrush and 
toothpaste together. For example, J between 5A toothbrush and Crest toothpaste is 
-2.25, p<0.001. Since the substitutability between two products does not only 
depend on the direct interaction between the bundles containing these two products 
but also on the indirect interactions via other bundles, we compute cross-price 
elasticities to examine the product substitutability across products and product 
categories in the next subsection. The price coefficients for both categories are both 
negative and significant (*ãH  =-0.16, p<0.001 for toothbrushes and *ãI  =-0.07, 
p<0.001 for toothpastes) disutility on price. The standard deviation of both price 
coefficients are significant (<'H  =0.13, p<0.001 for toothbrushes and <'I  =0.20, 
p<0.001 for toothpastes) suggesting large consumer heterogeneous tastes on prices. 
3.6.1 Price Effect 
Because the estimation results of the structural model are not immediately 
interpretable (Cameron and Trivedi 2005), we compute the own- and cross-price 
elasticities using the estimates in Table 3.4. The associated standard errors are 
estimated by taking the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters *êãH and *êãI, computing the statistic in question at each draw, and calculating the sample 
standard deviation (Berry et al. 1999, Nevo 2000).  Tables 3.5 present the own- and 
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cross-price elasticities. The diagonal numbers are the own-price elasticities, and the 
off-diagonal numbers are the cross-price elasticities. The results show the demand 
for the focal product and its price are inversely related: the demand decreases when 
the price increases. For example, the own-price elasticity for Colgate 1 Pack 
toothbrush is -0.50, indicating that a 1% increase in the price of Colgate 1 Pack 
toothbrush results in 0.50% decrease in its demand. The results are in the similar 
ranges to the findings in the literature that the price elasticities are typically between 
-4 and 0 (e.g., Bijmolt et al. 2005, Ghose and Yao 2011, Granados et al. 2012). All 
of the own-price elasticities are significant at the 5% significance level.  
Most within-category cross-price elasticities are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level, suggesting competing varieties within the 
product category are substitutes during a shopping trip. For example, within the 
toothbrush category, the cross-price elasticity of the Colgate 3 Pack toothbrush 
(row) on the 5A 1 Pack toothbrush (column) is 0.02, suggesting that a 1% increase 
in the price of the Colgate 3 Pack toothbrush results in a 0.02% increase in the 
demand for the 5A 1 Pack toothbrush. To take an example in toothpaste category, 
the cross-price elasticity of the Crest Large Pack toothpaste (row) on the Zhonghua 
Large Pack toothpaste (column) is 0.03, suggesting that a 1% increase in the price 
of the Crest Large Pack toothpaste results in 0.03% increase in the demand for the 
Zhonghua Large Pack toothpaste. The substitution pattern is asymmetric. This is 
because the price elasticities are influenced by the price of the related product and 
all the model parameters. The cross-price elasticity of 5A 1 Pack toothbrushes (row) 
on the Colgate 3 Pack toothbrush (column) on is 0.02. The cross-price elasticity of 
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Zhonghua Large Pack toothpaste (row) on Crest Large Pack toothpastes (column) 
on is 0.01. 
The cross-price elasticities between categories range from -0.01 to 0.71. 
Most of the cross-price elasticities between categories are positive, suggesting 
products in complements-in-use categories can be substitutes. For example, cross-
price elasticities between the Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush (row) on the Zhonghua 
Large Pack toothpaste (column) show that a 1% increase in the price of the Colgate 
1 Pack toothbrush results in 0.03% increase in the demand for the Zhonghua Large 
Pack toothpaste; and a 1% increase in the price of the Zhonghua Large Pack 
toothpaste results in 0.01% increase in the demand for the Colgate 1 Pack 
toothbrush. 
3.6.2 Stockout Effect 
To estimate the effects of stockouts on consumer demand, we conduct 
counterfactual analyses using the estimates in Table 3.4. We simulate the stockout 
effects when a product is not available in the consumers’ choice set. Each row in 
Table 3.6 presents the change in absolute markets shares 8  of other products 
following the stockout of one product. The diagonal cells are omitted as the focal 
out-of-stock product loses all its market share.  
The stockouts of a product induce consumers switching to products within 
the same category and in the other category. As expected, changes in all product 
market shares due to the stockout of a product in the same category are positive. 
                                                
 8	The market shares of all bundles add up to 1. 
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For example, when the Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush is out-of-stock, the market share 
of the Colgate 2 Pack toothbrush increases by 0.03%; when the Colgate Large Pack 
toothpaste is out-of-stock, the market share of the Colgate Medium Pack toothpaste 
increases by 0.09%. The stockout of a product in one category also positively 
affects the market shares of products in the other category. For example, the market 
share of the Colgate Small Pack toothpaste increases by 0.01% following the 
stockout of the Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush. 
There are also statistically significant switching into other brands when 
stockouts happen. For example, when the Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush is out-of-
stock, as a brand, Colgate’s market share decreases by 6.43% and Crest’s increases 
by 0.18%. Decomposing the change in market shares of toothbrush and toothpaste 
product, Colgate loses 6.51% market shares in toothbrush products but gain 0.08% 
market shares in toothpaste products, slightly making up its loss. At the same time, 
market shares of Crest increases by 0.12%, 0.06% in toothbrush products and 
0.08% in toothpaste products. 
3.6.3 Economic Impact 
While the results are statistically significant, it is important to show that the results 
are also economically significant. We calculate the effects on dollar revenue due to 
price increases. We assume that the total market size for toothbrush and toothpaste 
products is 12,8289 units and compute the dollar amount of revenue changes by 
using the statistics in Table 3.1 and price elasticities in Table 3.5. Table 3.7 presents 
                                                
 
9  The average sales of toothbrush and toothpaste products are 12,828 units in the supermarket 
chain during the data collection period. 
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the changes in revenue in dollars due to a 10% price increase10. For example, when 
Colgate 2 Pack toothbrush’s price increases by 10%, the revenue for the Colgate 2 
Pack toothbrush increases by $11.80 or 4.72%. Besides the revenue increase in the 
Colgate 2 Pack toothbrush, Colgate’s revenue also increases by consumer 
switching to other Colgate product. The revenue of the all Colgate product increases 
by $18.63 or 0.48%. Other brands also benefit from the price increase of Colgate 2 
Pack toothbrush: the revenue increases by $1.60 or 0.06% for Crest products, 
$117.18 or 22.10% for Shanghai products, $16.70 or 1.22% for Zhonghua products. 
The focal brand which increases its price is better off because of the revenue 
compensation from its other products. 
Similar to the price increase, we further calculate the effects on revenue in 
dollars due to stockouts. Table 3.8 shows the results. For example, when the 
Colgate 2 Pack toothbrush stocks out, the revenue of the Colgate 2 Pack toothbrush 
and all brands in the entire store decrease by $250.18 or 100% and $230.01 or 
2.60%, respectively. In this case, the revenue decreases by $240.68 or 6.20% for 
all Colgate products including toothbrushes and toothpastes, while the revenue 
increases by $5.91 or 0.21% for Crest products, $1.41 or 0.27% for Shanghai 
products, and $2.35 or 0.17% for Zhonghua products. Except when the Crest 4 Pack 
                                                
 
10 10% price increase for Colgate 1 Pack, Colgate 2 Pack, Colgate 3 Pack, Colgate 4 Pack, Crest 1 
Pack, Crest 2 Pack, Crest 3 Pack, Crest 4 Pack and 5A 1 Pack toothbrushes are $0.14, $0.13, 
$0.07, $0.04, $0.11, $0.17, $0.06, $0.07, $0.06 respectively. 10% price increase for Colgate Large 
Pack, Colgate Medium Pack, Colgate Small Pack, Crest Large Pack, Crest Medium Pack, Crest 
Small Pack, Shanghai Large Pack, Shanghai Medium Pack, Shanghai Small Pack, Zhonghua 
Large Pack, Zhonghua Medium Pack, and Zhonghua Small Pack toothpastes are $0.08, $0.10, 
$0.05, $0.07, $0.12, $0.12, $0.04, $0.06, $0.04, $0.05, $0.08, and $0.09 respectively. 
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toothbrush or the Shanghai Large Pack toothpaste is out-of-stock, the manufacturer 
loses its revenue when a product is out-of-stock. 
3.7 Consumer Welfare Analyses 
We estimate the changes in consumer welfare with respect to the price changes and 
stockouts. We use the compensating variation (CV), a standard welfare analysis 
approach, that measures the changes in consumer welfare when the characteristics 
of a product (e.g., price) are changed, or a product is removed from the consumers’ 
choice set (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The compensating variation is the amount 
that the consumer budget has to increase or decrease to keep consumer utility the 
same after her choice set changes (e.g., the introduction of a new product, the 
removal of the existing product or the price change of a product): .D = /ëfÉÑ,g,ífHífI maxj D"#$,E − /ëfÉÑ,g,ífHífI maxjQ D"#$,E , (3.16) 
where /ëfÉÑ,g,ífHífI ∙  is the expected value over random error F"#$,E  and random 
coefficient *"6 and *";; , is the consumer’s choice set before the change and ,′ is 
choice set after the change. With TIEV error F"#$,E, an analytical solution for the 
above equation can be written as (Gentzkow 2007): 
/ëfÉÑ,g,ífHífI maxj D"#$,E = /ífHífI çé `ÇfÉÑ,gj
≈ 1ñ çé `ÇfÉÑ,gjè . 
(3.17) 
We convert CV to dollars by dividing CV by price coefficient *", and compute 
standard errors for welfare estimates by taking 100 draws from the asymptotic 
distribution of the estimated price parameter  *ê6 and *ê; (Gentzkow 2007).  
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Table 3.9 presents the absolute and percentage changes in consumer welfare 
due to a 10% price increase or the stockout of a product. Price increases have 
negative and significant effects on the consumer welfare. For example, the welfare 
of a consumer reduces by $0.009 or 2.83% when the Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush 
increases its price by 10%. Stockouts do not have significant effects to reduce 
consumer welfare. 
3.8 Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter, we examine consumer demand within and cross product category 
under product substitution and analyze the effects of price changes or a product 
stocks out during a shopping trip. We use a large-scale transaction-level dataset on 
consumer packaged goods and apply a general random coefficients discrete choice 
model that allows interdependence across consumer multicategory choice.  
We find that the complements-in-use products such as toothbrushes and 
toothpastes can be substitutes during a shopping trip.  This is because consumers 
may have different shopping cycle and prefer to purchasing different categories 
during different shopping trips. There exists asymmetric substitution pattern, i.e. 
the price effect of one product on the demand for the other product is not necessarily 
the same as the price effect of the other product on the demand for the first product. 
Our study uses transaction-level data and complements the current research of 
multicategory demand using aggregate data. This allows us to observe consumer 
multicategory choices during a shopping trip. Contrary to the findings that 
complements-in-use products are complements-in-purchase (e.g., Manchanda et al. 
1999, Song and Chintagunta 2006), our finding suggests that during a shopping trip 
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consumers do not necessarily consider purchasing complements-in-use products 
together. Facing a price increase, consumers may substitute their purchase with 
products in complementary product categories.  
In addition to the price effect, another trigger for consumers to search for 
other products is product stockouts. Within the same product category, the market 
shares are mostly recovered in products of the big brands: Colgate and Crest, 
following a product stockout. The asymmetric effects of stockouts on the market 
shares still holds, i.e. the stockout effect of one product on the demand for the other 
is not necessarily the same as that of the other product on the demand for the first 
product. Our findings on cross-price elasticities and product substitutions under 
stockouts are consistent with Shocker et al. (2004) that the demand for the focal 
product depends on the other products’ prices and availability.  
Our results are not only statistically significant but also economically 
significant. Price increases may have a detrimental effect on the focal product’s 
revenue (i.e., when Colgate 1 Pack toothbrush, Colgate 2 Pack toothbrush, Crest 1 
Pack toothbrush, Crest 2 Pack or Crest Medium Pack toothpaste increases its price) 
but a positive effect to increase the brand’s revenue. However, stockouts hurt the 
manufacturer’s revenue no matter which product is out-of-stock. 
Our findings have a number of managerial implications. First, retailers need 
to consider not only the focal product but also products within and cross product 
categories when devising their pricing strategies, especially that consumers may 
not necessarily purchase complements-in-use products during the same shopping 
trip. Product substitutions become complex given the existence of the competing 
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varieties in the same product category and products in the other product categories. 
Retailers need to test product substitution pattern carefully before they set prices 
and the product inventory levels.  Although retailers may lose some sales for the 
focal product due to price increases, it is possible that the lost revenues can be 
recovered by the revenue gained from products within and cross product categories. 
The retailers may be better off in terms of revenues of the major brands. Third, from 
a manufacturer’s perspective, price increases and stockouts may decrease its 
revenue. One possible strategy to mitigate such a situation is that the manufactures 
should provide incentives for the retailers to keep their products in stock (Yao et al. 
2010).  
Finally, our research has several limitations. First, due to the limitation of 
our data, we cannot examine the consumer demand in response to other demand-
triggering variables such as advertising. Given that marketing strategies may have 
different effects on the demand for products and the interactions between products, 
it would be interesting to extend our model to study the effect of other demand-
triggering events on consumer multicategory demand. Second, our study uses the 
data collected from a supermarket chain for consumer packaged goods. Our 
findings should be generalized to other industry settings and other product 
categories with caution. Future studies may collect additional data from other 
industries and from other product categories to empirically study consumer 
multicategory demand.  
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Figure 3.1: Average Unit Price, Daily Sales and Stockout of Crest 4 Pack in a 
Sample Store 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Unit Price and Market Shares 
 Toothbrush  Toothpaste 
 Average Unit Price Market  Share  
Average 
Unit Price Market  Share 
Colgate 1 Pack 1.37 25.70% Colgate Large Pack 0.75 6.69% 
Colgate 2 Pack 1.25 6.33% Colgate Medium Pack 1.00 20.70% 
Colgate 3 Pack 0.65 14.64% Colgate Small Pack 0.49 3.33% 
Colgate 4 Pack 0.43 6.82%    
Colgate 0.95 53.49% Colgate 0.75 30.72% 
      
Crest 1 Pack 1.06 12.69% Crest Large Pack 0.72 10.09% 
Crest 2 Pack 1.66 2.62% Crest Medium Pack 1.23 11.23% 
Crest 3 Pack 0.56 15.65% Crest Small Pack 1.18 3.99% 
Crest 4 Pack 0.72 0.01%    
Crest 1.04 30.98% Crest 1.05 25.32% 
      
5A 1 Pack 0.63 11.96% Shanghai Large Pack 0.39 2.96% 
5A 0.63 11.96% Shanghai Medium Pack 0.62 9.69% 
   Shanghai Small Pack 0.35 2.38% 
   Shanghai 0.46 15.02% 
      
   Zhonghua Large Pack 0.45 6.15% 
   Zhonghua Medium Pack 0.84 15.15% 
   Zhonghua Small Pack 0.92 2.31% 
   Zhonghua 0.73 23.62% 
      
Other Brands 0.30 3.57% Other Brands 0.59 5.33% 
Note: prices of toothpastes are normalized to unit price per 100g. 
  
111 	
Table 3.2: Cross Tabulation of Toothbrush and Toothpaste 
 Buy toothbrush Didn't buy toothbrush 
Buy toothpaste 12,386 111,821 
Didn't buy toothpaste 38,342 28,323 
Note: to be specific, consumers purchased outside good during 28,323 shopping 
trips. 
 
Table 3.3: Reduced Form Estimation Results of Oral Products 
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) Toothbrushes 
(2) 
Toothpastes  
(3) 
Toothbrushes 
(4) 
Toothpastes 
Price 0.83 -0.11  0.46 -0.41 
 (0.63) (0.34)  (0.43) (0.29) 
Product Dummy Included Included  Included Included 
Store Dummy Included Included  Included Included 
      
Model Statistics      
R-squared 0.37 0.28  0.37 0.28 
F Statistics 93*** 146***  93*** 146*** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p<0.001 
Note: the dependent variables for Column (1) and (3) are daily sales quantity of 
toothbrushes, and the dependent variables for Column (2) and (4) are daily sales 
quantity of toothpastes. The independent variables for Column (1) and (3) are 
toothpaste price, and the independent variables for Column (2) and (4) are 
toothbrush price. 
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results 
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Intrinsic Preference of 
Toothpaste ó   Intrinsic Preference of Toothpaste ó  
Colgate Large Pack -0.71***  5A 1 Pack -1.16*** 
 (0.09)   (0.08) 
Colgate Medium Pack 0.39***  Colgate 1 Pack -0.08 
 (0.11)   (0.14) 
Colgate Small Pack -2.33***  Colgate 2 Pack -1.32*** 
 (0.06)   (0.13) 
Crest Large Pack -0.26**   Colgate 3 Pack -0.88*** 
 (0.09)   (0.08) 
Crest Medium Pack -0.238  Colgate 4 Pack -1.59*** 
 (0.13)   (0.06) 
Crest Small Pack -1.52***  Crest 1 Pack -0.97*** 
 (0.13)   (0.11) 
Shanghai Large Pack -1.87***  Crest 2 Pack -2.12*** 
 (0.05)   (0.16) 
Shanghai Medium Pack -0.57***  Crest 3 Pack -1.00*** 
 (0.08)   (0.06) 
Shanghai Small Pack -2.45***  Crest 4 Pack -4.55*** 
 (0.05)   (0.58) 
Zhonghua Large Pack -1.00***    
 (0.06)    
Zhonghua Medium Pack 0.03661    
 (0.10)    
Zhonghua Small Pack -1.95***    
 (0.11)    ò   Mean Price Coefficients ô  
5A brush_Crest paste -2.25***  Toothbrush Price -0.16*** 
 (0.04)   (0.02) 
5A brush_Colgate paste -2.48***  Toothpaste Price -0.07*** 
 (0.05)   (0.02) 
5A brush_Shanghai paste -2.37***    
 (0.08)    
5A brush_Zhonghua paste 
-2.27*** 
 Standard Deviation of Price 
Coefficients ö 
 (0.05)    
Crest brush_Crest paste -1.96***  Toothbrush Price 0.13*** 
 (0.03)   (0.01) 
Crest brush_Zhonghua paste -2.26***  Toothpaste Price 0.20*** 
 (0.04)   (0.01) 
Crest brush_Shanghai paste -2.36***    
 (0.07)    
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Crest brush_Colgate paste -2.50***    
 (0.03)    
Colgatet brush_Crest paste -2.42***    
 (0.03)    
Colgatet brush_Colgate paste -2.25***    
 -0.02294    
Colgatet brush_Zhonghua paste -2.58***    
 (0.03)    
Colgatet brush_Shanghai paste -2.84***    
 (0.06)    
Model Statistics     
N 
1257731
3 
   
Log Likelihood -571541    
χ2 299*** 
   
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.9: Changes in Consumer Welfare 
 10% Price Increase 
 Absolute Change 
Percentage 
Change 
Toothbrush   
5A 1 -$0.002 -0.77% 
Colgate 1 -$0.009 -2.83% 
Colgate 2 -$0.002 -0.78% 
Colgate 3 -$0.003 -0.97% 
Colgate 4 -$0.001 -0.38% 
Crest 1 -$0.003 -1.11% 
Crest 2 -$0.001 -0.34% 
Crest 3 -$0.002 -0.82% 
Crest 4 $0.000 -0.02% 
Toothpaste   
Colgate Large -$0.003 -1.09% 
Colgate Medium -$0.015 -4.21% 
Colgate Small $0.000 -0.16% 
Crest Large -$0.006 -1.85% 
Crest Medium -$0.013 -3.17% 
Crest Small -$0.004 -0.90% 
Shanghai Large -$0.001 -0.23% 
Shanghai Medium -$0.003 -1.14% 
Shanghai Small $0.000 -0.12% 
Zhonghua Large -$0.002 -0.58% 
Zhonghua Medium -$0.009 -2.66% 
Zhonghua Small -$0.001 -0.33% 
Note: Numbers in bold and italic are significant at the 
5% significance level. 
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